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Articles
Institutionalization, Investment Adviser
Regulation, and the Hedge Fund Problem
Anita K. Krug*
This Article contends that more effective regulation of investment advisers could be
achieved by recognizing that the growth of hedge funds, private equity funds, and other
private funds in recent decades is a manifestation of institutionalization in the
investment advisory context. That is, investment advisers today commonly advise these
“institutions,” which have supplanted other, smaller investors as advisory clients.
However, the federal securities statute governing investment advisers, the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, does not address the role of private funds as institutions that now
intermediate those smaller investors’ relationships to investment advisers. Consistent
with that failure, investment adviser regulation regards a private fund, rather than the
fund’s investors, as both the “client” of the fund’s adviser and the “thing” to which the
adviser owes its obligations. The regulatory stance that the fund is the client, which
recent financial regulatory reform did not change, renders the Advisers Act incoherent
in its application to investment advisers managing private funds and, more importantly,
thwarts the objective behind the Advisers Act: investor protection. This Article
contends that policymakers’ focus should be trained primarily on the intermediated
investors—those who place their capital in private funds—rather than on the funds
themselves and proposes a new approach to investment adviser regulation. In
particular, investment advisers to private funds should owe their regulatory obligations
not only to the funds they manage but also to the investors in those funds.

* Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. The Author thanks Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Jill E. Fisch, Sean M. O’Connor, and Kathryn Watts, as well as participants at a
February 2011 faculty colloquium at the University of Washington School of Law, for their comments
on earlier drafts of this Article.
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Introduction
A prominent topic in securities law scholarship during the past few
decades has been the fact and implications of the “institutionalization” of
the U.S. securities markets and the related phenomenon of
“intermediation.” Individual and smaller investors have ceased to be the
primary investors in these markets, having been replaced by institutions,
some of which—mutual funds, for example—serve as intermediaries
through which retail and other, smaller investors now primarily pursue
1
their investing activities. There are numerous reasons for the trend,
though perhaps one of the more pronounced is that most investors
simply cannot compete effectively with their institutional counterparts,

1. See infra notes 20–26 and accompanying text.
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given the latter’s resource advantages, such as in evaluating investments
2
and engaging third party advisers.
Causal claims aside, it can at least be said that the growth of
institutional investors and the movement of capital into them evinces a
robust symbiotic relationship. However, the effects have so far been only
partially explored. In particular, the growing body of literature on
institutionalization has sought to evaluate its implications for the capital
markets—such as whether institutional investors in public companies
may encourage greater shareholder activism and the extent to which
institutional access to private securities markets may render public
3
markets obsolete—and for investor protection. Although the literature
to date has produced some lively and important scholarly debate, as yet
it has centered generally on institutionalization as it pertains to corporate
issuers and the associated implications for the application and efficacy of
4
federal securities laws, particularly the Securities Act of 1933 and the
5
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, vis-à-vis regulation of corporate
6
issuers. Scholarly work has not encompassed the existence or effects of
institutionalization as manifested in the financial services industry—that
is, in the services provided by investment advisers or other financial
services professionals.
Investment advisory services have become institutionalized not so
much in terms of the services themselves but in terms of the clients to
whom those services are provided. It used to be the case, prior to the
institutionalization phenomenon of the past several decades, that
investment advisers provided personalized investment advice or
counseling to individuals and their alter ego entities (IRAs, trusts, and so
7
forth). They also advised what this Article refers to as “monolithic
entities”—entities embodying a unity of beneficial and legal ownership,
in the sense that they were not themselves vessels created for the
8
purpose of providing investment access to others. Over time, investment
advisers increasingly have come to provide their advisory services to
9
institutions of a certain stripe. These institutions are intermediating
2. See Brian G. Cartwright, Whither the SEC Now?, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1085, 1099 (2009)
(“Sophisticated institutional investors have highly professional staffs and substantial resources. They
can hire outside firms and advisers. They have access to extensive information technology
resources . . . . It is no wonder retail investors choose to invest through institutional intermediaries
rather than try to compete.”).
3. See infra Parts I.A–I.B and accompanying text.
4. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2010)).
5. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2010)).
6. See infra Parts I.A–I.B and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
8. See SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 1, 8–9
(1939) (setting forth a chart showing that investment advisory clients in the late 1930s included banks,
insurance companies, and nonprofit organizations).
9. See infra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
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institutions. They are pools of capital, including not only mutual funds
and other funds regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of
11
1940 but also—and more significant for this Article’s purposes—funds
12
that are “private,” labeled as such because they are not so regulated.
13
Hedge funds and private equity funds are in the latter category.
However, the federal securities statute that governs investment
14
advisers, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”),
does not, in many important respects, even contemplate that some
investment advisers may advise intermediating institutions such as
private funds. That disconnect is more than a little problematic. Under
the Advisers Act, “clients” are deemed to have autonomy and an
independent voice; they are seen as parties to an arms-length contract
with the adviser they have engaged, meaning that they may meaningfully
provide or withhold consent to any self-interested transactions the
adviser might propose, without themselves being conflicted or under the
15
adviser’s influence and control. An advisory client that is an individual

10. In light of the primary role of intermediating institutions in the institutionalization phenomenon,
the term “institutions” as used throughout this Article is intended to mean intermediating institutions,
except to the extent otherwise required by the relevant context.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2010). In addition, the securities of SEC-registered investment
companies, like those of any public company, must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933. See
id. § 77e (2010). Accordingly, anyone can invest in them regardless of their level of financial
sophistication or net worth, unlike private funds. See infra note 12.
12. Private funds are able to rely on one of the exclusions from the Investment Company Act’s
definition of “investment company” set out in section 3 of the Act. See id. § 80a-3(c). Private funds
such as hedge funds and private equity funds, for their part, rely on the exclusions set forth in section
3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. See id. § 80a-3(c)(1), (c)(7). Among other things,
those sections, in combination with private-placement requirements under the Securities Act, require
that these funds’ investors meet certain net-worth thresholds or other financial-sophistication criteria.
In particular, section 3(c)(1) effectively requires that investors be “accredited,” as defined in
Regulation D of the Securities Act, and section 3(c)(7) requires that investors be “qualified
purchasers,” which, for a natural person, is a requirement that the person own at least one million
dollars in net assets. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2011).
13. Different types of private funds came to acquire different labels—“hedge fund,” “private
equity fund,” and “venture capital fund,” for example—only through common parlance, as a result of
the different types of activities the funds pursued and the resulting differences in the capital
contribution and withdrawal rights provided to their investors. The “hedge fund” label was attached to
a type of fund for which the investment strategy revolved around relatively short-term and relatively
liquid investments and whose business terms, as a result, permitted investors to contribute capital over
the fund’s life and to withdraw capital at periodic intervals. Although the earliest hedge funds may
have contemplated both long and short positions and therefore pursued true “hedge”-based strategies,
that criterion is no longer important. For its part, “private equity fund” was the label given to a fund
whose investment strategy was to acquire large positions in private companies—rendering the fund’s
investments both long-term and relatively illiquid—and whose business terms, as a result, required
investors to invest, if at all, at the beginning of the fund’s term and permitted the return of investors’
capital only as the fund’s investments were “realized” several years hence.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2010).
15. See infra note 86.
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or a monolithic entity fits the Advisers Act’s prototype, having his or her
or its own voice and viewpoint, distinct from the adviser’s.
Failing to recognize institutionalization in the investment advisory
context, the SEC and most state securities regulators have come to
regard private funds, being the direct recipients and beneficiaries of
investment advice provided by their investment advisers, as merely
another type of advisory client, alongside clients that are individuals,
individuals’ personal trusts or retirement accounts, or monolithic
16
entities. In so doing, they generally have extinguished the independent
voice of the “client.” That is because, very often, a fund’s investment
17
adviser is the person who created, controls, and speaks for the fund. In
other words, the obligations the adviser owes to its “client” are
effectively obligations that the adviser owes to itself. Beyond its effects on
the Advisers Act’s coherence, that anomaly, which renders virtually
meaningless many obligations of investment advisers under the Advisers
18
Act, has important (adverse) implications for investor protection, the
long-standing goal of U.S. securities regulation.
Once investment advisory services are seen as yet another locus of
institutionalization—in the specific form of hedge funds and other
private funds—and once investment adviser regulation is evaluated
through the lens of institutionalization, a better approach to investment
adviser regulation reveals itself. In particular, this Article argues that
more effective regulation of investment advisers could be achieved by
recognizing that the growth of private funds in recent decades is a
manifestation of institutionalization and intermediation in the investment
advisory context. That recognition renders apparent that regulation
should focus on the ultimate, if indirect, recipients of the investment
advice provided by a private fund’s investment adviser: fund investors.
More specifically, investment advisers to hedge funds and other private
funds should owe most of their obligations (such as disclosure and
consent obligations) to fund investors, while continuing to owe certain
obligations (such as those relating to participation in the securities
markets) to the fund.
In making the case for reformed investment adviser regulation, this
Article brings together two strands of the literature: (1) the trends
toward institutionalization and intermediation as scholars have observed
and dissected them in other securities law contexts, and (2) the
regulatory issues created by the growth of hedge funds and other private
funds in the last thirty years or so. In doing so, the Article elucidates not
only the far reach of the institutionalization trend and dispels confusion

16. See infra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
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about “hedge fund regulation,” but also illustrates how the renewed
regulatory focus on fund investors that it proposes is consistent with and
supported by the history and the objectives of the Advisers Act.
Part I of this Article discusses what is meant by “institutionalization”
and “intermediation,” surveying the literature to date that raises
observations and concerns about the phenomena but fails to see the
broader context in which they have arisen. Turning to the other side of
the equation, Part II explores how Congress and the SEC regulate
private funds not through the adoption and refinement of a coherent
body of doctrine but rather through piecemeal add-ons to the Advisers
Act, which, until its recent amendment through the Dodd-Frank Wall
19
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), had
not recognized the existence of hedge funds or other private funds. Part
III discusses how that result came to be, exploring the characteristics and
evolution of U.S. regulation of investment advisers and, in light of the
institutionalization of the investment advisory industry, the ultimate
failure of that regulation. Part IV demonstrates how institutionalization
analysis, when applied to the investment adviser context, reveals a new
approach for thinking about investment adviser regulation in the privatefund context, one that is better equipped to achieve the goals of that
regulation: protection of those who entrust their assets with investment
advisers, whether directly or indirectly. In particular, it proposes that, for
some regulatory purposes, investors in private funds should be deemed
advisory clients of the investment advisers managing the funds. Finally,
Part V addresses possible objections to the approach this Article
proposes, including that existing regulation sufficiently protects privatefund investors and that the proposed approach is inconsistent with the
long-standing notion that investment advisory services are necessarily
tailored to each client’s particular needs and circumstances.

I. Institutionalization and Intermediation
Securities law scholars have devoted significant attention to the
phenomenon of institutionalization of U.S. and global securities
20
markets. The gist of institutionalization, as typically understood, is that,
over the last quarter century or so, the securities markets have become
increasingly dominated by a certain stripe of institutional investor:
mutual funds, pension funds, bank collective trusts, and other sorts of
19. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025 (2009); Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities
Regulation in the New Millennium, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 339, 347–53 (2008) (discussing
intermediation and deretailization). See generally Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities
Intermediaries, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961 (2010); Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of
Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1822 (2011).
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investment entities that pool the assets of numerous other, smaller
21
investors. Through that process, institutions have effectively supplanted
22
retail and other smaller investors.
Given the trend toward institutionalization, one might readily
discern another phenomenon arising from institutionalization that has
likewise received scholarly attention: intermediation. Whereas individual
and household investors and monolithic entities—“unitary investors,” for
the sake of expediency—previously pursued their securities investing
activities by investing directly in issuer companies, they now increasingly
23
invest indirectly, through institutional pools of capital. Scholarship
focusing on institutionalization and intermediation has largely centered
on their implications for the SEC’s regulatory regime, which (so the
argument goes) was designed to protect investments in corporate issuers
24
by individuals and households rather than by large institutions. One
strand of the scholarship has centered on the capital and securities
markets, evaluating the implications of institutionalization for regulatory
25
oversight of corporate issuers. A second strand has honed in on what
institutionalization means for the traditional regulatory objective of
protecting retail investors in connection with their investments in
26
corporate issuers.

21. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1026 (“The last thirty years or so have brought a rapid shift
toward institutionalization in the financial markets in the United States—in other words, a shift
toward investment by mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, bank trust departments, and
the like.”).
22. See Davidoff, supra note 20, at 350–51 (“Public securities are now increasingly held through
intermediaries and other private funds . . . rather than by retail investors.”); Fisch, supra note 20, at
1962–63 (“The ownership of public equity has shifted substantially from retail to institutional investors
since Congress enacted the federal securities laws in the 1930s.”); Rodrigues, supra note 20, at 1828
(“Individual long-term capital holders no longer hold shares of corporations directly; the direct
holders of shares predominantly are institutional investors.”).
23. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 1963–64 (“Many institutional investors are intermediaries in that
they invest a pool of capital contributed by other investors, most frequently retail investors. . . . A
growing percentage of ordinary citizens are invested in the capital markets through
intermediaries . . . .”). The trend is evidenced in the significant growth of the mutual fund industry
over the past several decades. See Investment Company Institute, Trends in Ownership of Mutual
Funds in the United States, Research Fundamentals, Nov. 2007, at 1, 2 (“The mutual fund is the
dominant form of intermediated investment. At the end of 2008, even after much of the market
collapse, equity mutual funds held over $3.7 trillion in assets, ninety-two percent of which were
contributed by the household sector.” (footnote omitted)).
24. See, e.g., Alison Grey Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A
Brief Review, 25 Hastings L.J. 311, 315–16 (1974) (observing that Congress’s primary concern in
enacting the Securities Act and the Exchange Act was “to provide protection for small investors”).
25. See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 20, at 352 (“[I]f sophisticated intermediaries now undertake the
bulk of investing, the protections of [the Securities Act and the Exchange Act] become procedural,
and the opportunities for deregulation increase.”).
26. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1025 (“[T]hroughout the SEC’s history and culture, the
rhetorical stress has been on the plight of average investors, ones who lack investing experience and
sophistication so as to need the protection of the securities laws.”).
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A. The Capital Markets
Focusing on the investing prowess of institutional investors, some
scholars have questioned whether the SEC can be—or, indeed, needs to
be—an effective regulator in an increasingly institutional capital
marketplace. As an initial matter, they note that, unlike retail investors,
institutional investors, which generally are presumed to be “sophisticated,”
may have the means and regulatory freedom to supply capital to issuers
that are inclined to eschew public registration and offering processes and
27
ongoing reporting obligations. This state of affairs, according to these
observers, encourages the growth of private securities markets largely
28
beyond the bounds of regulatory oversight. Beyond that, institutional
investors also have implications for the public securities markets, in that
their growing dominance in those markets may render extensive
29
regulation of them superfluous, not to mention needlessly burdensome.
That result, the argument proceeds, could be a catalyst for deregulation,
which, as some have suggested, could take the form of simplified
disclosure requirements or registration procedures, or, indeed, the
growth of “antifraud-only” markets, characterized by the absence of
30
disclosure and other regulatory requirements.
Those and other relatively descriptive analyses of the
institutionalization phenomenon have been met with more normative
evaluations of it. Viewing the trend relatively optimistically, several
scholars point to institutionalization as a force for greater shareholder
participation in corporate governance, a product of institutional
investors’ having replaced shareholders that were too small and
dispersed to seek or achieve any meaningful say in corporate policies and
31
decisionmaking. From that perspective, by requiring corporate
27. See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 20, at 352 (“Intermediaries . . . provide a strong alternative
supply of private capital to issuers who wish to avoid the costs associated with registration, the scrutiny
of the public offering process generally, and on-going public reporting obligations.”); Langevoort,
supra note 20, at 1057 (posing the question of whether, if institutional investment may be “equated”
with sophistication, “it might make sense to encourage a stark distinction between public and private
capital markets, letting the latter grow without substantial regulation based on the belief that, in
contrast to the public markets, sophisticated participants can ‘fend for themselves’”).
28. See Davidoff, supra note 20, at 352.
29. See id. (“[I]f investors in public offerings and public securities are largely sophisticated
intermediaries . . . . compliance with the federal securities laws becomes, to some extent, an
unnecessary transaction cost.”).
30. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1056; see also Davidoff, supra note 20, at 352 (“[I]f
sophisticated intermediaries now undertake the bulk of investing, the protections of [the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act] become procedural, and the opportunities for deregulation increase.”).
31. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,
39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 815 (1992) (“[C]orporate managers need to be watched by someone, and the
institutions are the only watchers available.”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1336–37 (1991); Edward B.
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445,
449 (1991).
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management to be more responsive to shareholders, institutional
investors ultimately benefit those smaller investors who now hold
32
interests in the institutions that replaced them. Others sound rather
more dire notes, asserting that institutional investors’ power, particularly
combined with their extensive activity in relatively less regulated
securities markets, means that they are poised to “exploit weaknesses
33
anywhere in the financial markets”—and have the motive to do so.
Still others, however, question institutional investors’ presumed
sophistication. Among other things, these scholars note that institutional
investors may, themselves, be prone to falling prey to certain types of
fraudulent activity or making ill-conceived investment decisions,
highlighting the inadequacy of the SEC’s investor protection mandate in
the institutional world. Jill Fisch, for example, argues that, given recent
revelations of fraud, such as the Madoff Ponzi scheme, and losses arising
from investments in collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), “even
sophisticated institutional investors require greater regulatory
34
protection.” If that is the case, Brian Cartwright notes, additional
35
regulatory challenges present themselves. For one thing, because the
SEC’s core competence is protection of retail investors, a regulatory
regime aimed at protecting institutional investors would have to look
36
very different from the one that presently exists. Moreover, making the
necessary changes to that regime would be difficult because, historically,
protecting retail investors has been more politically palatable than
37
protecting institutional investors.
B. Retail Investors
Some scholars have also, or instead, evaluated institutionalization
from the perspective of retail investors and how or whether they
continue to be protected in the age of institutionalization, in which their
relationships with issuer corporations are intermediated. The basis for
that project is evident from the simple fact that retail investors are an
integral component of the institutionalization phenomenon. In
Cartwright’s words, “[r]etail investors have not vanished,” but rather

32. See Black, supra note 31, at 871 (“Small shareholders are already frozen out of corporate
governance decisions. . . . The real question is whether small shareholders will gain or lose if large
institutions are more active. As long as the institutions can’t easily obtain private benefits from
influence, their oversight should benefit all shareholders, large and small.”).
33. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1057.
34. Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 Va. L. Rev. 785, 817 (2009).
Specifically, Fisch notes that large investors failed to assess and to manage the risks arising from CDOs
and were among the investors in Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. See id.
35. See Cartwright, supra note 2, at 1099, 1103.
36. Id. at 1103.
37. See id. at 1092 (“[Institutionalization] threatens eventually to undermine the SEC’s base of
rhetorical and political support.”).
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“have simply shifted to investing primarily through financial
38
intermediaries such as mutual funds.” Or, as Donald Langevoort puts it,
institutionalization “does not mean that retail investors make fewer or
39
less important investment decisions, simply different ones.” In this
segment of the institutionalization literature as well, themes of regulatory
insufficiency and inefficacy are pronounced.
As an initial matter, according to some observers, because
institutional investors may be subject to fewer regulatory restrictions on
their investment decisions, their beneficial owners—that is, the retail
investors for whom they serve as intermediaries—are deprived of a clear
understanding of the assets that the institutions hold and the basis for
40
their investment decisions. Other commentary has pointed out that
beneficial owners have a difficult time on that front even where the
intermediating institutions (such as mutual funds and other funds
regulated under the Investment Company Act) are subject to fairly
41
stringent regulatory requirements, including disclosure obligations.
Specifically, although mutual funds and other regulated investment
companies’ disclosure obligations are similar to those to which operating
companies are subject, those obligations are inadequate given that
“[p]urchasing a mutual fund . . . is not the same as investing in an
42
operating company.”
On top of that, institutional investors, such as mutual funds and
other intermediating institutions, actually are not necessarily all that
43
good at making investment decisions. For one thing, because
institutions—at least those acting as intermediaries—by definition work

38. Id.
39. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1030.
40. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 34, at 819–20.
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (2010) (setting forth requirements for periodic disclosures by mutual
funds and other registered investment companies); Fisch, supra note 20, at 2017–18 (critiquing the
Investment Company Act’s regulatory structure in part on the basis that it allows funds to “obscure”
information that investors need to evaluate mutual fund investments).
42. Fisch, supra note 20, at 2016. Fisch argues:
In moving toward product regulation, regulators should reject the analogy to common
stock. Investors are not attempting to determine the going concern value of productive
assets when they evaluate mutual funds or [exchange-traded funds]. Returns from a mutual
fund will not, for the average mutual fund shareholder, be based on managerial talent . . . .
Id. at 2029. Langevoort has also raised concerns about intermediaries that are mutual funds, observing:
With the recent trend toward greater institutionalization, some important regulatory
questions are self evident. Does the SEC (and/or other regulators who have responsibility in
financial services) do a good enough job of protecting retail investors who invest through an
institutional intermediary (that is, does mutual fund regulation need reform)?
Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1055.
43. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1046 (“[T]he evidence suggests that managed portfolios
offered to retail investors, on average, under-perform indexed portfolios with the same risk
characteristics when costs and fees are taken into account.”).
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with assets that ultimately belong to someone else (again, the
intermediated retail investors), “they may lack adequate incentives to
take appropriate levels of risk, to investigate thoroughly, or to disclose
44
conflicts of interest.” In other words, they make poor decisions out of
nonchalance and complacency. For some institutions, as others note,
poor investment decisions are a product of pure bad judgment and
analysis (apart from that produced by the absence of adequate incentives)
or a result of a drive to achieve competitive investment results even in
45
the face of “palpable” risk. The upshot of the literature, then, is that the
more relaxed regulatory environment and attenuation between investment
and beneficial owner in the institutional context has eroded investor
protection, insofar as the investor at issue is the smaller, retail investor.
It is in the discussions about investor protection that the literature
on institutionalization and intermediation suggests an intersection with
the regulation of investment advisers. The regulation of investment
46
advisers is founded on investor protection objectives, and perhaps the
most fundamental trend in the investment advisory industry over the past
eighty years falls squarely in the institutionalization phenomenon. That
trend is the widespread displacement of individual or other smaller
investment advisory clients by institutional clients—specifically, by hedge
funds, private equity funds, and other (generally privately offered)
pooled investment entities that investment advisers create and manage
and market to people who, in an earlier era, would themselves have been
47
direct advisory clients. In addition, it should be no surprise that an
associated phenomenon has emerged, in which those displaced advisory
clients now obtain advice about investing indirectly, by placing assets
with advisers through the very institutions that have become the new
48
advisory clients.
44. Fisch, supra note 34, at 819; see also Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance:
How Incentive Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 41, 57
(2008) (“[Institutional investors are not] properly incentivized to play the role of loyal servant to
shareholder interests.”).
45. Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 439, 450–51 (2010)
(evaluating why, prior to the financial crisis, institutional investors were “such willing buyers” of
securitized debt and postulating (among other things) that “market participants took no evasive action
because of a felt need to compete and not leave any money lying on the table”).
46. See James C. Sargent, Comm’r, SEC, The SEC and the Investment Counselor, Address
Before the Investment Counsel Association of America, Inc. 2 (May 19, 1960), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1960/051960sargent.pdf (“The basic purpose of the Investment
Advisers Act was to protect the public and investors against malpractices on the part of persons
engaged for compensation in the business of advising others with respect to securities.”).
47. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
45,172, 45,174–75 & n.36 (proposed July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279)
[hereinafter 2004 Proposed Rule] (“[From 1993 to 2003] the rate of growth of hedge funds [was]
substantially greater than that of other sectors . . . . [and] assets of insurance companies and
commercial banks doubled; and deposits of commercial banks barely doubled.”).
48. See infra notes 107–14 and accompanying text.
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II. The Problem of Hedge Fund Regulation
As most anyone who has read the news in recent years is aware,
private funds—particularly hedge funds—often have been regarded by
regulators, not to mention the public, as problems that need to be
49
solved. This sentiment reached new heights in the aftermath of the
financial crisis that took hold in 2008, when policymakers, commentators,
and scholars set about to formulate and evaluate laws and regulations
50
intended to prevent a similar turn of calamitous events in the future.
Through mid-2010, when the House of Representatives and the Senate
51
agreed in conference committee on the content of new legislation,
52
financial regulatory reform was a central policy issue and hedge fund
53
regulation was prominent in reform discussions. The final legislation,
49. See Editorial, Closing in on Hedge Funds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2006, at A22 (“[H]edge funds
that are active in both equity and debt markets face huge temptations to trade on insider
information. . . . [Administration officials should] respond to the obvious problems posed by hedge
funds—before those problems become crises.”); Editorial, Regulating Hedge Funds, N.Y. Times, Sept.
24, 2006, at C11 (noting, after the collapse of the Amaranth group of hedge funds, that regulators must
act now to create enforceable rules and proposals for Congress regarding hedge fund oversight); see
also Dane Hamilton & Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Connecticut Official Blasts Hedge Fund Proposal,
Reuters,
Apr.
15,
2008,
available
at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/companyNewsMolt/
idUKN1547928220080415; Editorial, Hedging on Hedge Funds, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 2006, at A28
(“[Hedge funds] remain largely beyond the reach of federal overseers . . . . It’s time to move the
discussion beyond whether hedge funds require more regulation to how they should be regulated.”);
Rachelle Younglai, Critics Call for Better Policing of Hedge Funds; Need “Real Teeth,” Nat’l Post,
Apr. 16, 2008, at 5 (“We need regulations with real teeth that require registration, increased disclosure
and strict standards for risk management.” (quoting Rich Ferlauto, director of pension and benefit
policy for the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees)).
50. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to
Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 39, 112–13 (2009) (urging caution in “[t]he increasing focus on bold reform to concentrate
regulatory authority,” given that there may be “some enduring merits of the traditional U.S.
fragmented approach” and that “[a]dditional concentration . . . may . . . prove unsustainable”);
Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and Comparative
Perspectives, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 581, 582 (2010) (“[A]n analysis of the subprime crisis and proposed
solutions is incomplete if international and comparative perspectives are not brought to bear.”);
Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2010) (“Regulators must
focus on the principal problems that financial regulation is intended to address—relating to financial
stability and risk-taking—without regard to fixed categories, intermediaries, business models, or
functions.”).
51. See, e.g., David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation, Harv.
L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (July 7, 2010, 9:15 am), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2010/07/07/summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-regulation-legislation (“On June 25, 2010, a
House-Senate conference committee reached final agreement on the [Dodd-Frank Act] . . . .”).
52. See, e.g., State Street Spends $380,000 to Lobby Government, Bus. Insider (June 28, 2010),
http://www.businessinsider.com/state-street-spends-380000-lobbying-in-1q-2010-6 (“Regulatory reform
has been hotly debated for more than a year following the recession and credit crisis.”).
53. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The SEC in a Time of Discontinuity, 95 Va. L. Rev. 667, 682 (2009)
(“[Financial regulatory reform should address] obvious areas of omission like credit default swaps and
hedge funds.”); Rob Silverblatt, Kanjorski Discusses Hedge Fund Regulation, U.S. News & World Rep.,
Fund Observer Blog (Oct. 15, 2009), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/Fund-Observer/2009/10/
15/kanjorski-discusses-hedge-fund-regulation (noting, in an interview with Rep. Paul Kanjorski, that
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the Dodd-Frank Act, brought the widely predicted result that hedge
funds and other private funds will henceforth be subject to additional
54
regulation.
This most recent round of hedge fund regulation had its origins in
55
the worst days of the financial crisis, when mitigating systemic risk
became a primary objective of financial regulatory-reform efforts,
including securities regulatory reform. Two concerns, in particular,
underlay that objective. First, as the events of the financial crisis
highlighted, financial institutions are connected with one another in ways
56
that can magnify the effects of any single institution acting alone. In the
worst of outcomes, one firm’s failure can trigger the failure of other firms
that had entered into transactions with the failed firm, which in turn can
57
trigger failures with still other counterparties down the line. Second,
these intertwined financial institutions’ activities had become too
58
complex in the years leading to 2008. Investment banks, in particular,
had taken to creating and marketing increasingly complicated securities
and derivative instruments in which institutional investors had taken to
59
investing. The combination of these two factors meant not only that
investors were at risk of losses arising from unknown risks and untoward
sales pitches but also that the financial system as a whole was at risk of
financial contagion. That contagion would assume the form of systemwide failures stemming from the activities of one or two institutions but
spreading far beyond, in the process destroying value and growth
60
throughout the economy.

“hedge funds have emerged as a key puzzle piece” in financial regulatory reform efforts).
54. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010).
55. “Systemic risk is the potential that a single event, such as a financial institution’s loss or
failure, may trigger broad dislocation or a series of defaults that affect the financial system so
significantly that the real economy is adversely affected.” Robert K. Steel, Under Sec’y Domestic Fin.,
Remarks on Private Pools of Capital (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/hp280.aspx.
56. See Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine 259–63 (2010).
57. By most accounts, the concern about the possible failure of large financial firms stemmed
from the fact that “some gargantuan, unknown dollar amount of credit default swaps had been bought
and sold on every one of them.” Id. at 263. Accordingly, a firm’s failure would “trigger the payoff of a
massive bet of unknown dimensions.” Id.
58. See, e.g. Editorial, The Crisis Agenda, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 2008, at A30 (arguing that, in a
debate between then-presidential candidates John McCain and Barack Obama, “the candidates need
to say what rules they would support to rein in derivatives, like . . . the complex and unregulated
financial bets that led to the bailouts of Bear Stearns and American International Group”).
59. See Charles R. Morris, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers, and
the Great Credit Crash 73–85 (2008) (detailing the development and spread of complex CDOs).
60. In the 2008 crisis, the dots were not difficult to connect: Structured credit instruments created
and marketed by investment banks permitted mortgage lenders to transfer the risks of subprime
mortgage loans, leading to a bubble in the housing market that, upon bursting, endangered the
liquidity of Wall Street financial firms and sapped the wealth of Main Street businesses and
consumers. See id. at 84.
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Beyond the concerns that financial firms were bound together in a
web of complexity, policymakers and commentators perceived still
another threat on the systemic risk front. That threat arose from the
concern that there exists a “shadow” banking system consisting of
unregulated institutions engaging in the same sorts of financial activities
61
pursued by regulated financial institutions. Those activities, precisely
because they are beyond regulators’ purview, could, the argument went,
fuel systemic disruptions in ways that regulators would be poorly
62
equipped to address. Included in an oft-cited litany of shadowy bankers
were unregulated affiliates of regulated brokerage firms and insurance
companies, at least to the extent they were engaging in proprietary
63
trading and other speculative investment activities, and hedge funds. If
financial regulatory reform had to address systemic risk, doing so would
entail addressing all institutions, including hedge funds, whose activities
64
were perceived as having systemic implications.

61. See Mike Konczal, Shadow Banking: What It Is, How It Broke, and How to Fix It, Atlantic
(July 13, 2009, 1:08 pm), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/07/shadow-banking-what-itis-how-it-broke-and-how-to-fix-it/21038/ (describing the origins of, and problems associated with, the
shadow banking system);
62. See Sewell Chan, Paulson and Geithner Back Calls for Tighter Regulation, N.Y. Times, May 7,
2010, at B5 (quoting Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner’s statements that the 2008–2009 financial
crisis would have been “less severe” if the United States had had “better-designed constraints in risk
taking” and that the United States “didn’t have the tools to prevent the fire from jumping the
firebreak and infecting the system”).
63. See id. (“[The] shadow banking system [is] the network of investment banks, insurance
companies, mortgage finance entities and hedge funds that largely went unchecked by a regulatory
system that was structured around commercial banks.”). Among other things, hedge funds are
significant participants in the markets for credit default swaps and other types of derivative
instruments, and they (and private equity funds) often use leverage in their investment activities.
However, by many accounts, hedge funds’ involvement in the sorts of investment and trading activities
that gave rise to the financial crisis paled in comparison to the activities conducted by major brokerage
firms. See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation
and Investor Protection, 6 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 240, 292 (2009) (“[Hedge fund investments in mortgagerelated securities were very limited compared to those of other market participants.”); Edmund L.
Andrews & Louise Story, U.S. to Detail Plan to Rein In Finance World, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26. 2009, at
A1 (“Hedge funds have generally not been implicated in the financial collapse, which stemmed
primarily from reckless mortgage lending and exotic financial instruments tied to subprime
mortgages.”); Joe Nocera, Hedge Fund Manager’s Farewell, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2009, at B1 (“As it
turns out, it was the big regulated entities, the banks and investment banks, that were the problem, not
the unregulated hedge funds.”).
64. See Andrews, supra note 63, at A1 (“[A] growing number of lawmakers and policymakers are
worried that hedge funds have become too big a part of the financial market to operate without
government monitoring.”) Somewhat secondarily, with the revelation of a number of high-profile
financial fraud cases, including Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, investor protection—and, particularly, more
stringent “transparency” requirements—became another basis for additional “hedge fund regulation.”
See The Madoff Investment Securities Fraud: Regulatory and Oversight Concerns and the Need for
Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 4 (2009)
(statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs).
Transparency, in the investor-protection context, has generally referred to requirements that hedge
funds make available to their investors information about their operations and investment activities,
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Accordingly, by 2009 it was a given that whatever financial reform
legislation Congress adopted, it would subject hedge funds and, most
65
likely other private funds, to greater regulation. However, the
literature, the commentary, and testimony before Congress regarding
financial regulatory reform, to the extent relating to hedge funds and
other private funds, reflected misunderstandings about the nature of
private funds and their place within the U.S. securities-regulation
framework. Most prominently, the discussions revolved around changing
the regulations to which funds were subject, as though there exists a
66
regulatory regime where those amendments might be at home. There
does not. As testimony to that fact, all but one of the reform proposals
put before Congress in 2009 addressed hedge funds and other private
funds through proposed amendments to the Advisers Act, the federal
67
securities statute that regulates investment advisers. However, one
would generally never have known that based on the surrounding media
coverage and political commentary.
Commentary about the proposals generally did not speak in terms
of how the new legislation would eliminate, or substantially curtail, an
exemption in the Advisers Act that had permitted investment advisers to
hedge funds and other private funds to avoid becoming registered as
investment advisers, nor did it discuss how new hedge fund
“transparency” requirements were to be implemented through subjecting
investment advisers to additional obligations, namely, obligations to
report to the SEC certain information about any hedge funds they
including their prior performance, how they value their portfolio investments, the terms on which
investors may place capital with or redeem interests in them, and the nature of their portfolio
investments, including whether those investments are relatively illiquid or liquid. See Asset
Managers’ Comm. to the President’s Working Grp. on Fin. Mkts., Best Practices for the Hedge
Fund Industry 1, 12 (2009) (discussing what information hedge funds should disclose to increase
transparency). With that information, transparency proponents contend, investors should be able to
better evaluate whether the funds are suitable investments and, based on that evaluation, act
accordingly. See Shadab, supra note 63, at 288 (“[A]s competition for investor capital increases and
investors become more sophisticated and comfortable with the funds, investors are increasingly
demanding that hedge funds disclose information about the types of investments they make, their risk
management policies, and other practices.”)
65. Most legislative proposals for financial regulatory reform included provisions covering hedge
funds or investment advisers to hedge funds. See infra note 67 (listing several of the more prominent
proposals).
66. See infra note 68.
67. See, e.g., Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. §§ 401–16
(2010) (setting forth Senator Christopher Dodd’s March 2010 comprehensive financial regulatory
reform proposal, including the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010); Private
Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 3818, 111th Cong. (2009) (regulatory reform
proposed by Representative Paul Kanjorski in October 2009, which in turn was based on the Obama
administration’s July 2009 proposal on financial regulatory reform); Private Fund Transparency Act of
2009, S. 1276, 111th Cong. (2009) (regulatory reform proposed by Sen. Jack Reed in June 2009);
Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 711, 111th Cong. (2009) (regulatory reform
proposed by Representatives Michael Castle and Michael Capuano in January 2009).
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happen to manage. Rather, policymakers, commentators, and observers
alike placed discussions about the prospective changes to the Advisers
68
Act within the rubric of hedge fund regulation. Presumably, the
discussion would have been framed differently had participants
understood that the proposed changes were to be made to a statute that
governs investment advisers and that, prior to the recent financial
69
regulatory reform, did not so much as mention hedge funds.
The Advisers Act was the target of regulatory reform insofar as it
addressed hedge funds not because it was the most logical candidate, at
least not as it was structured prior to the Dodd-Frank Act. Even with the
recent amendments that the Dodd-Frank Act brought about, the
Advisers Act remains woefully ill suited to encompass hedge fund
regulation because it still fundamentally reflects how investment advisers
operated their businesses in 1940, when investment advisers did not
70
manage pools of capital that we now think of as hedge funds. Rather,
the new regulation of hedge funds found its way into the Advisers Act
presumably because the rules adopted by the SEC over the years
pursuant to its authority under the Advisers Act had come to
acknowledge that at least some advisers manage private funds and on
71
that basis subjected those advisers to sporadic additional regulation.
Indeed, amending the Advisers Act was arguably the only choice
because, with the exception of the Investment Company Act (which had
its own difficulties as a repository of the new regulations) no other
securities statute addressed hedge funds at all.

68. See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez, Citing Financial Reform, Dodd Quits Fund-Raiser, N.Y.
Times, May 1, 2010, at A14 (noting that the financial regulatory reform bill proposed in the Senate by
Senator Christopher Dodd would, among other things, “impose new rules on hedge funds”); Carl
Hulse, House Approves Tougher Rules on Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2009, at A1 (noting that
the financial regulatory reform bill approved by the House of Representatives in December 2009
“include[d] a number of other provisions to address . . . regulation of hedge funds”); Stephen Labaton,
An Overhaul of Financial Rules Is Taking Shape, N.Y. Times, June 2, 2009, at B1 (noting that, under
the Obama administration’s proposal on financial regulatory reform, “hedge funds would be required
to register with the S.E.C. and provide access to their books”); Stephen Labaton, Senators Bid to
Regulate Hedge Funds, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 2009, at B1 (“It’s time to subject financial heavyweights
like hedge funds to federal regulation and oversight to protect our investors, markets and financial
system.” (quoting Sen. Carl Levin)); Editorial, Starting the Regulatory Work, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 2009,
at A30 (“[I]n addition to regulating previously unregulated investment instruments, Washington must
impose regulations on equally unregulated hedge funds.”); Louise Story, Hedge Funds Step Up Efforts
to Avert Tougher Rules, N.Y. Times, June 23, 2009, at B3 (“The registration of hedge funds . . . has
figured prominently in discussions of reform for years.”).
69. Over the years, however, the SEC had incorporated into its rules under the Act various
sporadic references to “private fund” and “private investment company,” categories that include
hedge funds. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(d) (2011) (defining “private fund”); id. § 275.205-3(d)(3)
(defining “private investment company”).
70. See infra notes 73–83 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., 2004 Proposed Rule, supra note 47 (setting forth proposed regulations that would
require hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC).

Krug_21 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

December 2011]

THE HEDGE FUND PROBLEM

12/5/2011 11:31 PM

17

In light of the historical (yet understandable) omission of hedge
funds from the Advisers Act’s coverage, Dodd-Frank’s amendments to
the Advisers Act have the unfortunate effect of perpetuating hedge fund
regulation through hodge-podgism. They tack hedge fund regulation
onto a statute that covers investment adviser regulation, with no attempt
to integrate the two realms or make the case that, in fact, the two should
be integrated for the sake of better regulation of both investment
advisers and private funds. Because the Advisers Act has retained its
1940 objectives and structure, which revolve around the SEC’s mission of
investor protection, it no longer achieves the goals for which it was
intended—precisely because so many investment advisers do manage
hedge funds, which these days are subject to regulatory scrutiny in part, if
not primarily, on the basis of their perceived contributions to systemic
72
risk. As discussed in Part III, that the Advisers Act has ceased to reflect
the activities of investment advisers in the twenty-first century is largely a
product of the institutionalization phenomenon, despite that being far
from obvious based on the literature about institutionalization or, for
that matter, hedge fund regulation.

III. Investment Adviser Regulation and Its
Evolution and Failure
The regulation of investment advisers in the United States has
become obsolete. This is not because investment advisers have
diminished in importance or because regulation has otherwise become
unnecessary. It is because the federal statute governing investment
advisers—the Investment Advisers Act of 1940—and related SEC
regulations have ceased to speak to what many investment advisers today
do. That may seem to be a striking claim and may raise the question of
why, if investment adviser regulation no longer works, more has not been
made of it. Arguably, one of the more prominent reasons is that the
extent of obsolescence of investment adviser regulation went from being
merely apparent to being incontrovertible only recently, in the wake of
the financial crisis. At the same time, however, that obsolescence
generally was misdiagnosed, discussed in the context of hedge fund
regulation or investor protection. Policymakers, scholars, and

72. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, To Reduce Hedge Fund Risk, Let Everyone In, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 17, 2009, at F8 (arguing that systemic risk is the real issue with hedge funds and, accordingly, that
the main focus of hedge fund supervision should be monitoring systemic risk); Stephen Labaton, An
Overhaul of Financial Rules Is Taking Shape, N.Y. Times, June 2, 2009, at B1 (“A central goal of [the
Obama administration’s proposal on financial regulatory reform] is to more tightly control companies
that are now largely unregulated but could pose risks to the financial system if they failed, such as
hedge funds.”); Louise Story, Hedge Funds, Unhinged, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2009, at B1 (“[T]here’s
been a near-consensus that hedge funds can cause systemic risk.” (quoting Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Financial Services Committee)).
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commentators have had great interest in those topics but, by all
appearances, often have not been sufficiently versed in the doctrines and
legal principles that underlay and shape the reforms they advocate.
A. Origin and Nature of Investment Adviser Regulation
1.

Investment Advisers as Personal Counselors

For almost as long as the U.S. public has been investing in securities,
there have been people whose business has been to provide advice on
investment options. Beginning in the 1920s, the U.S. investment advisory
industry came into its own alongside the nascent U.S. securities
73
industry. In early investment advising, the relationships between client
and adviser were generally regarded as close and personal consulting
74
relationships, although there were always exceptions. Advisers were
seen as trusted counselors advising wealthy clients regarding their
portfolios and securities investments, and their advice and
recommendations were tailored to their clients’ specific concerns and
75
investment needs.
These images of investment advisers as personal consultants to
neighbors needing trustworthy securities-investing guidance permeated
investment advisers’ Senate testimony as Congress considered legislation
that would, for the first time, regulate the business of providing
investment advice. One investment adviser testifying before Congress in
1940 stated that the investment advisory industry “depend[ed] for its
success upon a close personal and confidential relationship between the
76
investment-counsel firm and its client.” Another claimed that “when
you are dealing with investment counsel, you are dealing with
reputation . . . . [and with] [m]en who depend for their livelihood upon
77
the opinion of others as to their integrity and their capabilities.”

73. See SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 3–4
(1939) (“[After World War I] a marked tendency developed in the growth of a class of investment
counselors unaffiliated with any other form of financial organization. . . . The post-war boom in
stocks . . . attracted . . . the attention of private individuals who up to that time had been more likely to
put their funds in savings banks, mortgages, [and] local investments . . . .”).
74. See id. at 5 (discussing the emergence of investment advisory firms and, observing in that
regard that, in the years after 1920, “there developed . . . a distinct class of persons who held
themselves out as giving only personalized investment advisory service”).
75. See id. at 23 (noting that, in the view of various representatives of investment advisory firms,
“the primary function of investment counselors” was “to render, on a personal basis, competent,
unbiased, and continuous advice regarding the sound management of investments”).
76. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the
S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 713 (1940) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement
of Charles M. O’Hearn, Vice President & Director, Clarke, Sinsabaugh & Co., Investment Counsel).
77. Id. at 751 (statement of Rudolf P. Berle, General Counsel, Investment Counsel Association of
America).
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Of course, even in the early years of the investment advisory
industry, advisory relationships did not conform to a single model. Many
relationships were of the so-called “non-discretionary” variety, in which
advisers would merely recommend securities transactions to their clients,
leaving it to the clients to determine whether to act on those
78
recommendations for their own accounts. Other advisory relationships
were of the “discretionary” variety, meaning that once a client had
engaged an adviser, the adviser had full authority not only to determine
which securities investments might be appropriate for the client but also
to “pull the trigger”—to purchase or sell those securities on behalf of the
79
client’s account without further input from the client. There were other
differences as well: among them, advisers charged different fees,
maintained different limitations on the number of clients and minimum
size of client accounts, and claimed different strengths based on the
80
professional experience of their personnel.
The characteristic that investment advisers throughout the industry
largely shared, however, was their small size and local focus—two factors
that arguably served to reinforce one another. In a world in which
communication lacked speed and ease, at least relative to today’s
standards, investment advisory firms were local businesses and therefore
81
sought local clientele. And, perhaps as a result of those circumstances,
advisory clients, though comprising some institutions, were often unitary
82
clients—individuals, their family members, and their alter ego accounts.
In other words, the investment advisory industry, at the time that
Congress first saw fit to regulate it, was more “retail” and less
83
institutionalized and intermediated than what it would become.

78. See SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 13 (1939)
(“[Some investment advisers surveyed had the power to] make recommendations to [their] client[s],
with whom rest[ed] the ultimate power to accept or reject such recommendations . . . [while others
had] firm control over the client’s funds, with the power to make the ultimate determination with
respect to the sale and purchase of securities for the client’s portfolio.”).
79. See id. (“No consistent practice has been adopted by investment counsel firms with respect to
discretionary or advisory powers.”).
80. See id. at 16–18.
81. See id. at 7 (“[In the mid-1930s, investment advisory firms] ha[d] been organized as sole
proprietorships and have remained ‘one-man investment counsel firms’ [and] apparently ha[d] not, as
yet, achieved the degree of popularity with the investing public sufficient to warrant their expansion
through the medium of branch offices.”).
82. See id. at 9 (discussing the composition of advisory clients in the mid-1930s and noting that
“[t]he importance of private or individual clients is indicated by the fact that . . . these individual or
personal accounts represented about 83% of all the accounts administered”).
83. See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 20, at 351 (“[R]etail investors, who once owned more than 90%
of publicly traded equity, now own less than 30%.”).
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Investment Advisers as Fiduciaries

At the inception of the U.S. investment-adviser regulatory regime,
then, the industry looked substantially different than it does today. For
many in the early generations of investment advisers, the profession was
84
hardly one in which the federal government should intervene.
Nonetheless, since 1940 investment advisers in the U.S. have been
subject to federal regulation: The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was a
final component of the post-Depression overhaul of the U.S. financial
85
regulatory system. True to the expectations of the advisory personnel
testifying before Congress about the then-impending legislation, the
Advisers Act had the effect of requiring investment advisers to become
registered with the SEC and to comply with myriad substantive
86
requirements.
To be sure, in the aftermath of the Depression, investment advisers
were not alone in becoming regulated. The Advisers Act was just a part
of the new regime of financial industry regulation and, more specifically,
securities industry regulation. Perhaps most significant for the investment
adviser profession, the dawn of investment adviser regulation coincided
with the passage of another federal statute governing the investment
87
industry: the Investment Company Act of 1940. While the Advisers Act
88
was to govern investment advisers, the Investment Company Act set
89
about to regulate investment companies —entities to which many
(generally smaller or “retail”) investors contributed capital and that
invested that capital on an aggregate, or pooled, basis. Preceding the

84. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 716 (statement of Charles M. O’Hearn, Vice
President & Director, Clarke, Sinsabaugh & Co., Investment Counsel) (arguing that the federal
regulation of investment advisory firms proposed by Congress would, among other things, weaken
investment advisory firms’ incentives to maintain “self-disciplinary” efforts, such as establishing and
adhering to “codes of professional practice”).
85. See Larry D. Soderquist & Theresa A. Gabaldon, Securities Law 12–13 (4th ed. 2011).
86. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2010). Among the Advisers Act’s requirements, both then and
now, are that an adviser’s agreements with its clients must contain certain provisions regarding
assignment of the advisory contract, id. § 80b-5(a), and advisers are prohibited from entering into
transactions with their clients unless they provide certain disclosures and obtain the clients’ consent,
id. § 80b-6(3). The Advisers Act also contains broad antifraud provisions that govern all investment
advisers, whether or not they are registered as such with the SEC. Id. § 80b-6. In addition, the SEC
staff “examines” each registered adviser periodically—meaning that the examiners visit the adviser’s
premises for several days, ask questions of the adviser’s personnel about the adviser’s business
activities and procedures, and review the adviser’s books and records. See id. § 80b-4. Registered
advisers deemed to have “custody” of client assets must also take special measures to ensure the
safekeeping of those assets. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2011).
87. Ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64).
88. An investment adviser that is subject to federal regulation under the Advisers Act registers
with the SEC by submitting a registration application with the SEC (and updating the information on
that application on at least an annual basis) and must comply with the Advisers Act and the SEC’s
rules under that Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(c) & 80b-4.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)–(c).
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passage of the Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act was
Congress’s enactment of the bread-and-butter legislation regulating
public companies’ issuance and resale of securities: the Securities Act of
90
91
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Securities industry regulation, perhaps more than regulation of
nonsecurities financial services, is based on the circumstance that
customers’ and clients’ participation in securities transactions is
characteristically a product of aspirations of capital appreciation—
92
increased wealth or income—through wise investment decisions. Of
course, with today’s near-universal access to the securities markets,
participation in them has become so prevalent that it may now be seen
by prudent investors as a necessary activity rather than as merely an
elective. Nonetheless, the prospect of the substantial rewards (with, of
course, the attendant risks) that are often part of securities-investing
activity historically has made the securities industry, as compared with
other financial services industries, particularly susceptible to fraudulent
and manipulative activities. This is especially true when combined with
the characteristically intangible nature of securities—the uncertainty
93
about what, exactly, a security holder owns. In the United States, of
course, these factors gave rise to a special regulator (the SEC) charged
with policing misconduct in the securities markets and to a particular
flavor of regulation.
Securities industry regulation, in simplest terms, has historically
94
focused on disclosure—the sharing of all material facts and risks. That
90. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2010)).
91. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2010)). Companies
intending to raise capital in the public markets became subject to the registration and reporting
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which, for their
part, also subjected broker-dealers to regulation by the SEC and, later, the National Association of
Securities Dealers (which in 2007 became the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority). See Order
Approving NASD and NYSE Proposed Rule Change Relating to Consolidation of Regulatory
Functions, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169, 42,169-70 (July 26, 2007). In addition to the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (repealed 2005), and the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–77bbbb
(2010)), also preceded the enactment of the Investment Company Act and the Advisers Act.
92. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[S]hareholders to a very real degree
voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business judgment. Investors need not buy stock, for investment
markets offer an array of opportunities less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment by corporate
officers.”).
93. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Securities Regulation: Cases and Analysis 89 (2d
ed. 2008) (noting that securities markets are characterized by an “information asymmetry” between
insiders and outsiders and that “[i]f . . . insiders and professionals are free to exploit that informational
advantage, outsiders will be reluctant to participate in the market”).
94. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, Happy Life of Municipal
Securities Regulation, 34 J. Corp. L. 739, 744 (2009) (“It is a given, if not invariably true, that federal
securities regulation is disclosure-based, and it is logical, if not inevitable, that the issuers of securities
be the ones made responsible for disclosure.”); Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann,
Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
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is, issuers and other sellers possess information that, when disclosed,
assists investors’ evaluation of whether to buy the securities, furthering
95
the larger goal of efficient allocation of capital. Again, however,
investors are not required to invest, and if they choose to forge ahead
after the required disclosures, then they assume the risks that have been
disclosed and generally are hard-pressed to complain later if those risks
96
materialize. Like other financial industry regulation, securities regulation
has as a primary goal consumer or customer protection—or, more
97
accurately, investor protection. However, it achieves that goal less
through substantive rules governing the firms’ operations and provision
of services and more through disclosure requirements intended to level
the playing field.
With that in mind, a primary theme of U.S. regulation of investment
advisers has historically (and persistently) been oversight of disclosure
practices. Both the Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act were
responses to perceived abuses in the investment industry in the 1920s and
1930s and, in particular, to advisers’ using their relationships with their
clients to further their own interests, whether through causing clients to
enter into transactions with the advisers, causing clients to invest in the
same securities as those held by the advisers, or myriad other self98
interested transactions involving client relationships. Given the objectives
of the Advisers Act and securities law more generally (among other
rationales), the Advisers Act obligates investment advisers to act in
furtherance of their clients’ best interests and to disclose to clients all
99
conflicts of interest that may affect their ability to meet that obligation.
Exchange Act of 1934, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 329, 330 (1988) (observing that securities registration
requirements were designed to effect “the full disclosure of truthful information regarding the
character of the securities offered to the public”).
95. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First
Amendment, 43 U. Kan. L. Rev. 163, 191–92 n.129 (1994) (“[A] principal rationale for securities
regulation [turns on] efficient allocation of resources.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed
Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J.
1, 66 n.245 (2001) (noting that improving allocative efficiency or pricing accuracy is widely assumed to
be the primary rationale of securities regulation).
96. See C. George Nnona, In the Wake of the Mortgage Bubble and Financial Crisis: What Should
Securities Regulation Become?, 79 UMKC L. Rev. 31, 41 (2010) (“[Under disclosure philosophy,
disclosure is] a regulatory mechanism that evinces the view that securities are inherently speculative
and that the decision to get involved in that speculation is one to which each ought to come with fully
open eyes and informed minds following appropriate disclosures.”).
97. See Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in International
Securities Transactions, 2000 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 51, 104 (“[T]he very root of the mandate for
securities regulation [is] investor protection.”); Franklin Allen & Richard Herring, Banking Regulation
Versus Securities Market Regulation 2 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 01-29, 2001),
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/0129.pdf.
98. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186–92 (1963) (discussing the
history and purpose of the Advisers Act).
99. See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers,
55 Vill. L. Rev. 701, 718 (2010). The regulation of broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange Act
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Put another way, unlike many financial services professionals
outside the securities industry, U.S. law perceives investment advisers as
100
fiduciaries to their clients. If there were any doubt about that initially,
the Supreme Court eliminated it in a 1963 case, SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, in which the Court concluded that the Advisers Act
reflects “a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of
101
an investment advisory relationship,’”
along with a purpose of
eliminating or disclosing “all conflicts of interest which might incline an
102
investment adviser . . . to render advice which was not disinterested.”
Among the purposes of the federal securities laws, the Court noted, was
promoting “a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry”
and replacing a “philosophy of caveat emptor” with “a philosophy of full
103
disclosure.” Investment adviser regulation, which began as regulation
of a specific type of professional relationship—between advisers and
their generally smaller and local clients—involves a specific type of
duty—one requiring investment advisers to place clients’ interests above
104
their own.
B. The Evolution and Failure of Investment Adviser Regulation
1.

The New Advisory Client

Today, as in 1940, the job of investment advisers is to advise their
105
clients on their securities investments.
In addition, advisers’
relationships with their clients continue to be either discretionary or
nondiscretionary, depending on a particular adviser’s strengths and

was founded on a similar sentiment, that of ensuring that brokers and dealers act fairly toward their
customers in effecting securities transactions, whether for their own accounts or the accounts of others.
However, that regulation has been “ambiguous” on the question of whether broker-dealers owe
fiduciary-like obligations to their customers. See id. at 723 (“Courts have looked to a number of factors
to determine whether brokers are fiduciaries . . . . Most courts . . . conclude that only brokers for
discretionary, as opposed to non-discretionary, accounts are considered fiduciaries.”).
100. See Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 191–92.
101. Id. at 191 (quoting 2 Louis Loss, Securities Regulation 1412 (2d ed. 1961)).
102. Id. at 191–92.
103. Id. at 186.
104. Importantly, to the extent investment advisers’ status as fiduciaries has particular implications
for the standards of conduct to which advisers must adhere, advisers and their clients generally may
qualify those standards. For example, the investment advisory agreement could provide that the
investment adviser may cause other accounts it manages (including its own accounts) to invest in the
same securities as the client’s account and may receive fees or other compensation from issuers of
securities held in the client’s account, without having any obligation to account to the client for any
part of those fees or other compensation. Moreover, the agreement’s liability provisions could provide
that the adviser will not incur liability to the client in connection with its services under the agreement,
except to the extent of losses arising from the adviser’s gross negligence or willful violation of law.
105. See Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2010) (“‘Investment adviser’ means any person
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value of securities or as
to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities . . . .”).
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modes of operations and their clients’ preferences. Advisers are still
varied in their strategies, strengths, and experience. And investment
advice remains investment advice, in the sense that it is still
fundamentally a process in which advisers advise clients on securities
investments (and, increasingly, other types of investments, such as in
commodities futures, options, and derivatives). Notwithstanding the
considerable continuity, however, much has changed in the past eightyplus years.
As an initial matter, a primary point of departure from the postDepression era is that client-adviser relationships have diverged from the
counselor-client model, with advisory services turning away from the
idiosyncratic needs and diversification requirements of individual clients.
Rather, today the services investment advisers seek to provide (financialplanning services aside) are based on the special and proprietary
investment processes they have developed, their “secret sauces”
designed to achieve returns that surpass the returns of the broader
106
market. Accordingly, an investment adviser that has developed a
proprietary strategy is unique among investment advisers to the extent of
that strategy. The adviser will seek to sell prospective clients and
investors not on the individualized services it provides but, rather, on the
advantages of its strategy—of the particular way that it makes securities
investments for all of its clients (often on an aggregated basis). With this
evolution, advisory services have, in a sense, become approaches to
investing that clients can take or leave, by either engaging the relevant
adviser(s) or by using other advisers.
That investment advisers offer clients access to proprietary
strategies along with, or (as is often the case) instead of, more
personalized and encompassing investment advice is inseparable from
another important change in the nature of advisory clients. As discussed
above, the trend has been toward the institutionalization of advisory
clients—that is, an increase in the portion of advisory clients that are
institutions, as opposed to unitary investors, such as individuals and their
alter ego accounts and monolithic entities. Moreover, the institutions
that have received the most attention in recent years on that point are
those that serve as intermediaries for retail and other unitary investors,
namely investment funds—pools of capital contributed by a number of
investors, whose objective is to invest that capital on an aggregate basis.
Smaller investors, both of the retail and the more sophisticated varieties,
that in an earlier era may have directly contracted for investment
106. That is, advisers’ strategies aim to realize “alpha.” See Alpha—Definition and Other
Information, Hedge Funds Consistency Index, http://www.hedgefund-index.com/d_alpha.asp (last
visited Oct. 31, 2011) (“Alpha is a risk-adjusted measure of the so-called ‘excess return’ on an
investment. It is a common measure of assessing an active manager’s performance as it is the return in
excess of a benchmark index or ‘risk-free’ investment.”).
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advisory services have increasingly moved away from such direct
relationships in favor of placing their assets in pooled investment
107
vehicles: mutual funds, hedge funds and other private funds, pension
108
funds, insurance products, and the like, which, in turn, enter into
investment advisory relationships.
Investment funds, whether of the private or the public variety, are
ideal investment-management vehicles for those advisers who effectively
offer strategies rather than more personal advisory services. Of practical
necessity, a fund has an investment objective and pursues an investment
strategy of its own, apart from any investment objectives or strategies of
the fund’s various investors. Therefore, the investment adviser managing
the fund’s investment activities can market the fund to investors based
on the particular strategies that the adviser has developed rather than on
the adviser’s approach to (and expertise at) advising clients on which
investments, out of the spectrum available, will be most desirable for a
client’s total investment portfolio in light of the client’s particular needs,
desires, and circumstances.
In this regard, private funds (as opposed to their public counterparts)
are particularly interesting and, from a regulatory perspective,
particularly nettlesome. Private funds exist by virtue of exclusions set
forth in the Investment Company Act that permit small pools of capital
that offer their securities privately to investors meeting specified
109
financial sophistication criteria. They can pursue most any investment
strategy and most any type of investment, including “short” positions,
leveraged transactions, and derivative instruments, and, unlike public
funds, are permitted to enter into performance-based compensation
110
arrangements with their advisers. Although the original drafters of the
Investment Company Act may have intended that funds meeting the
requirements of the exclusions would comprise only a small portion of
the investment-fund universe, the exclusions came to effectively swallow
the rules as capital invested in private funds began to rival the amounts
invested in funds that were subject to SEC regulation under the

107. Although private funds’ investors are not “retail” in the usual sense of the word, they may
comprise individuals and their personal accounts and in that sense are relatively more retail than the
institutional investors that have come to dominate direct investments in securities.
108. See Davidoff, supra note 20, at 348 (“[Retail] investors increasingly eschew or are effectively
closed off from direct purchase of securities and instead invest through intermediaries. This
‘deretailization’ trend is most prominently illustrated by the extraordinary growth of the mutual fund
industry.”); id. at 349 (noting “[a] separate investment intermediation trend among private,
sophisticated investors” who have increasingly invested in hedge funds and other private funds).
109. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
110. See Davidoff, supra note 20, at 363. Such arrangements generally provide that the adviser is
entitled to a specific percentage—usually twenty percent—of the fund’s net profit each year in excess
of any net profit that merely recovers prior losses. Id.
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111

Investment Company Act. Given the amount of assets that private
funds encompass, the incentives that perpetuate them, and their status as
unregulated investment funds, private funds are at the heart of the
question of how the institutionalization phenomenon may speak to
112
investment adviser regulatory reform.
Although it is imprecise to characterize the evolution of the
investment advisory industry in hard-and-fast terms, it is inescapable
that, today, direct (as opposed to intermediated) advisory clients are
generally larger and more institutional—and are working with relatively
113
more capital—than was the case in the 1920s and 1930s. These
institutional clients have displaced many smaller clients, who now pursue
114
their investment activities as investors in private funds. The Advisers
Act, however, does not reflect the changes that have taken place in the
investment advisory industry, whether in terms of products and services
offered or in terms of the clients that engage advisers to provide those
products and services. This is not to say the Advisers Act has not
changed at all over the years or that those changes ignore developments
in the advisory client “census.” Since 1940, Congress has periodically
amended the Advisers Act, and the SEC has adopted an array of
Advisers Act rules pursuant to the authority provided by Congress—and
at least some of those amendments and new rules acknowledge and
purport to address concerns arising from the institutionalization of the
investment advisory industry.
As discussed in Part II, the most recent changes occurred in 2010,
when Congress amended the Advisers Act as part of the Dodd-Frank
Act. Most significantly, those amendments eliminated the exemption
from registration under the Advisers Act on which many large advisers

111. See id. at 353 (“[H]edge funds in part exist outside the regulatory purview of the SEC . . . and
other private capital pools . . . are largely unregulated. The consequence is . . . a significant portion of
the U.S. capital market increasingly outside the federal securities laws . . . .”) While the financial crisis
had the effect of reducing substantially the amount of assets placed in hedge funds and other private
funds, these funds remain a desirable repository of investment capital both for high net worth
individuals and institutions. See Shadab, supra note 63, at 243–44 (noting that hedge funds lost
nineteen percent of their value following the 2008 financial crisis, compared with a loss of forty-two
percent for global equities).
112. Mutual funds and other “public” funds, by contrast, are less important to that question
because of the extent to which they, as institutions, are directly regulated for the specific purposes of
protecting investors.
113. Advisers’ clients have changed in other ways. Some advisers, as an alternative to (or in
addition to) managing private funds, continue to manage client assets on a nonpooled basis. Those
clients may be high-net-worth individuals, but they also increasingly are institutions—those of the
variety that are prime candidates for hedge fund investments but that may see advantages in the
“separately managed account” model of investing, to the extent that advisers are willing to offer that
model given the arguably higher administrative and compliance costs involved. See infra note 129.
114. See 2004 Proposed Rule, supra note 47, at 45,173 (“Instead of managing client money directly,
[a growing number of investment] advisers pool client assets by creating limited partnerships, business
trusts or corporations in which clients invest.”).

12/5/2011 11:31 PM

Krug_21 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

December 2011]

THE HEDGE FUND PROBLEM

27

115

to hedge funds and other private funds had relied. They also require a
registered investment adviser to maintain certain records regarding each
private fund it manages, including the amount of leverage the fund
employs and the fund’s counterparty credit-risk exposure; trading and
investment positions; valuation policies and practices; and trading
116
practices. The amendments further allow the SEC to mandate periodic
reports from private fund advisers for possible use by the Financial
117
Stability Oversight Council in assessing systemic risk. Despite these
and earlier amendments to the statute and associated episodes of SEC
rulemaking, however, the contours and structure of investment adviser
regulation have remained relatively static and, more to the point, have
not successfully confronted and addressed the regulatory gaps created by
institutionalization.
2.

The Obsolescence of Investment Adviser Regulation

The Advisers Act regulates the relationships between investment
118
advisers and their clients. Accordingly, the Act obligates advisers to do
certain things vis-à-vis their clients, such as seek consent before engaging
119
in certain self-interested transactions, provide disclosure regarding
conflicts of interest to which the adviser might be subject and other
120
information about the adviser’s business activities, and, under certain
121
circumstances, deliver periodic account statements to them. That
advisers should owe their obligations to their clients seems
incontrovertible: to whom else should advisers owe duties, particularly
given that those duties are fiduciary in nature? The evolution of the
investment advisory industry has made things more complex than that,
however, and in that complexity now lies the critical flaw in the Advisers
Act.

115. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–71 (2010). The statute
exempts from the Advisers Act’s (new) registration requirements advisers that manage only “venture
capital funds”—a term to be defined by the SEC—or that have less than $150,000,000 under
management, though it expressly grants the SEC authority to require those exempted advisers to
“maintain such records and provide to the Commission such . . . reports as the Commission determines
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” Id. §§ 407–408.
116. Id. § 404(2) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(3)).
117. See id. § 404 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(4)–(5)).
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1–22 (2010).
119. See id. § 80b-6(3).
120. This disclosure is required under Part II of Form ADV, the investment adviser registration
application. See Amendments to Form ADV, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,234, 49,287 (Aug. 12, 2010) (“As a
fiduciary, you also must . . . make full disclosure of all material conflicts of interest between you and
your clients that could affect the advisory relationship.”). The SEC adopted Form ADV pursuant to
its authority under section 203(c) of the Advisers Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c); 17 C.F.R. § 279.1
(2011).
121. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a) (2011) (setting forth requirements for advisers deemed to
have “custody” of client funds or securities).
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At the Advisers Act’s inception, clients—again, the subjects to
whom the adviser owed its regulatory obligations—were by and large
understood to be those persons (individuals, in many cases) who placed
122
certain of their assets under the adviser’s management. Those persons
were both the legal owners and the beneficial owners of the assets, and,
accordingly, the question of who should be deemed the client
presumably did not arise. That is not the case today, at least not to the
extent an adviser is managing a hedge fund or other pooled investment
entity. That is, the emergence and growth of private funds, such as hedge
funds, private equity funds, so-called family partnerships, and similar
entities that pool capital largely for the purpose of investing in securities
and related instruments has separated legal ownership from beneficial
ownership: the fund is the legal owner of the assets being managed; its
investors are the beneficial owners.
The Advisers Act not having taken a position on who, exactly, the
client should be in the fund context, subsequent SEC rulemaking and
congressional amendments have produced a doctrine under which the
“client” is the person or entity that has legal ownership (as opposed to
123
beneficial ownership) of the assets being invested. In other words,
when an investment adviser manages a hedge fund or other private fund,
the persons who place their assets with the adviser and who decide when
to terminate the adviser’s services—that is, the investors—
counterintuitively are largely not those to whom the adviser owes its
124
obligations. They do not have client status, and, as such, they are not
125
entitled to many of the protections the Advisers Act provides to clients.
Rather, the adviser’s client in this context is the fund, which, therefore,
enjoys the consent, disclosure, and reporting rights set forth in the
Advisers Act and, conversely, is the “thing” to which the adviser owes its
obligations under the Advisers Act. Fund investors, by contrast, not
126
being clients, are not entitled to the protections of the Advisers Act.
This Author has elaborated elsewhere the difficulties with that
circumstance. In brief, it effectively obviates the statute’s investor

122. See supra notes 73–83 and accompanying text.
123. Despite the incoherent results produced by designating an investment fund the “client” of its
investment adviser, how that result came about can be discerned from post-1940 case law and SEC
interpretations. For an explanation of the evolution of the definition of “client” in the private fund
context, see Anita K. Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor for “Hedge Fund Regulation”: A
Reconsideration of “Client” Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 661, 664–68,
686–91 (2010).
124. See id. at 673.
125. See id. at 673–79.
126. See id. at 672–73 (noting that, under current SEC doctrine, an investment adviser managing a
hedge fund or other private fund may consider the fund—rather than any investor in the fund—to be
the adviser’s client).
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protection function. More specifically, in many cases, private funds are
structured such that the investment advisers managing them effectively
speak for and control them, whether as general partner, managing
member, or sponsor (the actor responsible for the fund’s creation and
128
operation). In those cases, the adviser’s obligations under the Advisers
Act to disclose information to clients or to obtain clients’ consent
effectively distill to obligations for the adviser to obtain its own consent
129
and to disclose information to itself. Or, using the terminology of rights
rather than obligations, the rights held by the adviser’s client are held by
the fund, meaning that only the adviser itself may exercise and enforce
130
them.
These anomalies mean that the Advisers Act is to some degree
incoherent, given the investor-protection rationale for securities industry
regulation: In light of the institutionalization of the investment advisory
industry, current investment adviser regulation does not address the
theory of market failure that drives investment adviser regulation in the
first place. If regulation of investment advisers remains necessary—that
is, if market forces still create unacceptable market externalities that
131
should be addressed through regulation —then there currently is a

127. See id. at 672–83 (arguing that current doctrine, whereby a fund is regarded as the advisory
client for regulatory purposes, redounds to the detriment of fund investors).
128. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
129. This result is rendered more troublesome as a result of the fact that a fund investor would
have generally the same investment experience with the adviser but with client status if the investor,
rather than investing in the fund, instead pursues a so-called “separately managed account”
arrangement with the adviser. In such an arrangement, the investor would place assets in a custodial
account under her own name and grant the adviser power of attorney to manage the account, which
would often be managed pursuant to the same strategy that the adviser employs for the funds it
manages and often subject to the same or similar fee and liquidity terms as the ones that apply to the
funds. The investor would enjoy the rights of a client simply because of the separateness of the
investor’s assets. Placing them in an account under the investor’s own name removes the
intermediation that arises from pooling assets in a separate entity with the assets of other investors and
creates a direct relationship between investor and client.
130. There are exceptions to that result. Private funds are commonly structured using
“subadvisory” arrangements, in which the advisers actually responsible for investing a fund’s assets are
not the same firms that formed and control the fund. Those advisers—or subadvisers, as they are
usually called—are often third-party independent contractors to the funds whose assets they manage.
In those cases, in connection with a subadviser’s advisory obligations vis-à-vis the funds it subadvises,
the Advisers Act’s requirements may be more meaningful. There, someone independent from the
subadviser (namely, whoever happens to be the fund’s managing member, general partner, or other
control person who engaged the subadviser in the first place) retains control over the fund.
131. Regulation might not be necessary, for example, if clients and investors were able adequately
to protect themselves through negotiating the terms of the advisory relationship. In the private fund
context, it may be that investors could bargain for the inclusion of investor-protective terms in the
fund’s governing documents, such as the operating agreement or limited partnership agreement. Such
terms might include a right for investors to initiate the fund’s dissolution, to remove or replace the
fund’s investment adviser, to approve certain types of transactions or substantive changes to the fund’s
investment strategies, or to receive periodic, comprehensive disclosures about the fund’s and the
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mismatch. Regulation remains targeted at a particular problem, namely,
misconduct by investment advisers vis-à-vis those who entrust the
advisers with management of their assets. That problem, however, has
been largely overshadowed by externalities that regulation mostly
ignores, namely, the severing of the entrustor-advisor relationship that
has arisen with institutionalization.
Correcting that situation involves considerably more than tweaking
a definition here or there. For example, the regulatory incoherence this
Article highlights does not necessarily mean that fund investors should
be deemed clients for all regulatory purposes or that there are not
meaningful differences between investors that place assets with
investment advisers through private funds and those that place assets
with the advisers directly (such as through so-called separately managed
132
account arrangements ). Accordingly, if the Advisers Act is going to
have a cogent regulatory purpose going forward, the challenge is to
address the anomalies that have arisen with institutionalization and
resolve competing understandings of what is a “client.” The regulatory
reforms involving the Advisers Act made in the aftermath of the most
recent financial crisis neither take on this challenge nor acknowledge it.
Rather, beyond broadening the swath of advisers that must become
registered under the Advisers Act, they merely address the concern,
highlighted in the financial crisis, that private funds (read: hedge funds)
were engaging in investment activities that were not only risky and
complex but also unknown to regulators and investors.
In other words, the recent changes do not address the investorprotection concerns that gave rise to investment adviser regulation and
that the growth of the private-fund model has brought, once again, to the
fore. Rather, they take as a given the Advisers Act’s continued efficacy
as to investor protection and focus primarily on the recently heralded
133
objective of systemic risk mitigation. Granted, in the revised regulatory
regime, investment advisers to most hedge funds now (or soon-to-be)
SEC registered, must disclose to the SEC information regarding the

adviser’s activities and possible conflicts of interests. Any such assumption of investor negotiating
power, however, would depend not only on investors’ knowing what terms to request but also, and
more critically, on their being able to identify and coordinate with one another, agree on a common
approach or course of action, and share the costs of pursuing it. Although investors have to some
extent overcome this collective action problem in various contexts, such as in the private equity fund
context, particularly where a large investor takes the lead in negotiating investor-protective terms, the
challenge is substantially greater where investors are generally smaller and more dispersed.
132. See supra note 129.
133. In particular, the Dodd-Frank Act requires investment advisers to hedge funds and other
private funds to register as investment advisers with the SEC under the Advisers Act and to report
information to the SEC about the funds they manage, with the intent that regulators will be able to
determine whether the funds’ activities threaten systemic stability. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 403–404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571–72 (2010).
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funds’ investment strategies and objectives, including leverage levels and
134
data regarding portfolio positions. Beyond that, however, little has
really changed—certainly not the identity of an adviser’s client or the
obligations owed to those who have (indirectly) entrusted their assets
with the adviser. As discussed below, the Advisers Act should be
restructured to focus on how hedge funds and other private funds fit
within the Advisers Act as a matter of institutionalization and
intermediation—intermediation that separates sophisticated unitary
investors (the original focus of the Act)—from their investment advisers.

IV. A New Approach to Investment Adviser Regulation
The preceding Parts have discussed the evolution of the investment
advisory industry from one in which clients were generally individuals or
other smaller investors to one in which hedge funds are some of the most
common, and most desirable, advisory clients. That is a product of
institutionalization, as it has manifested itself in the provision of
investment advisory services. The concerns created by institutionalization,
however, are not unlike some that have emerged in the context in which
institutionalization has been traditionally discussed: institutions’
supplanting retail and other unitary investors as shareholders of
135
corporate issuers. In the investment advisory context, the pertinent
questions involve the relative obligations of investment advisers to the
funds they manage versus their responsibilities to the investors in those
funds. More to the point, to what extent should investment adviser
regulation be concerned with investors who now pursue their activities
through investing in hedge funds and other private funds, rather than
through direct relationships with investment advisers?
A. Reconceptualizing “Client”
As suggested above, one response to the fact that intermediation
deprives investors of rights they enjoyed as direct (un-intermediated)
advisory clients may be to declare that intermediation does not matter.
Policymakers could simply determine that there should be no substantive
regulatory difference between, on one hand, someone’s directly engaging
an adviser to manage his or her portfolio and, on the other hand, his or
her investing in a fund that the adviser manages. The result of such a
determination would be that, for purposes of the Advisers Act and its
rules, intermediated investors would be treated the same as unintermediated investors and, therefore, would have the same rights and
protections vis-à-vis the adviser they have (indirectly) engaged. So, for
example, a fund’s investors would be entitled to receive the disclosures to
134. See id. § 404; see also supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 38–48 and accompanying text.
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which clients are entitled under the Advisers Act and have the same
rights to consent to any self-interested transactions proposed by the
fund’s investment adviser.
That seemingly easy solution—to redefine “client,” in the privatefund context, to mean a fund’s investors—becomes less plausible when
one considers more closely the content of an investment adviser’s
regulatory obligations. As fiduciaries, advisers’ obligations extend
beyond satisfying disclosure and consent requirements and otherwise
136
adhering to the Act’s formal specifications. Rather, in connection with
137
investing their clients’ assets, advisers must act in clients’ best interests.
Among other things, advisers must seek the “best” brokerage and trade138
execution services on behalf of clients, ensure fair treatment to all
clients who buy or sell securities at the same time and otherwise treat
139
similarly situated clients fairly, and make investments in accordance
140
with the applicable investment objectives and strategies. They must
also seek to mitigate conflicts of interest that may arise from their (or
their employees’ or agents’) trading in the same securities, or in the same
types of securities, as they are buying and selling on behalf of their
141
clients.
The nature of those obligations is such that, in the
intermediated context, their subject must be the entity that is actually
engaging in the buying or selling activities—that is, the thing that legally
owns the assets being managed—rather than the entity’s beneficial
owners. Any displacement of the entity by the investor as the subject of
an adviser’s obligations raises the question of what remains, if anything,
of the adviser’s obligations to the entity.
One approach to addressing that concern could be to specify that an
adviser owes its obligations not only to fund investors but, in keeping
with current doctrine, also to the fund itself. That solution has its own
136. See, e.g., Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,841, 60,842 (proposed Sept.
26, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
137. See, e.g., id. at 60,848 (“Under the Advisers Act, investment advisers are fiduciaries that must
act in their clients’ best interest with respect to functions undertaken on behalf of their clients . . . .”).
138. See, e.g., Scott E. Desano, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2815, Investment Company
Act Release No. 28534, 94 SEC Docket 2738, 2740 (Dec. 11, 2008) (“Under Section 206 of the
Advisers Act, an investment adviser has a fiduciary duty to seek best execution for its clients’
securities transactions.”).
139. See, e.g., Electronic Filing by Investment Advisers; Proposed Amendments to Form ADV, 65
Fed. Reg. 20,524, 20,538 n.178 (Proposed Apr. 17, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 275, 279)
(“Generally, our staff has not recommended enforcement action against advisers that aggregate trade
orders on behalf of clients, so long as the adviser allocates the trades in a way that treats all clients
fairly.”).
140. See, e.g., Concourse Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1451,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7111, Investment Company Act Release No. 20698, 58 SEC Docket 26,
28 (Nov. 15, 1994) (observing, in an SEC enforcement action, that the respondent was “was required
to engage only in transactions that complied with the Fund’s investment policies and restrictions”).
141. See Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696, 41,702-03 (July 9, 2004) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275, 279).
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complications, however, especially when evaluated against the backdrop
of corporate-governance doctrine. In particular, to conclude that advisers
should owe obligations both to the intermediating institution and to its
investors would require careful consideration of the two constituencies’
competing interests. As corporate-governance doctrine evidences, any
particular investor’s interests may be markedly different from other
142
investors’ interests, not to mention those of the entity. The business
judgment rule and the demand requirement in the derivative lawsuit
143
context are merely two examples of that recognition. Corporations’
interests are furthered and defended by those who have been designated
fiduciaries to the corporation as an entity (and the shareholders as a
144
group )—the directors—rather than the shareholders or any particular
145
group of shareholders. To the extent that investment-adviser regulatory

142. See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton & Richard D. Freer, The Law of Corporations in a
Nutshell 151 (6th ed. 2011) (“In most instances . . . a shareholder does not have to act with the best
interests of the business or other shareholders in mind.”).
143. See Charles R.T. O’Kelley & Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and Other Business
Associations 399 (6th ed. 2010) (noting that the demand requirement, like the business judgment
rule, supports the board of directors’ authority to govern the corporation).
144. See, e.g., Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 128 F.2d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff’d, 318 U.S. 80 (1943)
(“[W]hile officers and directors are trustees for stockholders as a body with respect to the business and
property of the corporation and in the management of its affairs, they are not trustees . . . to the
individual stockholder, since they have no control over his shares.”); O’Kelley & Thompson, supra
note 143, at 267 (“[A] director . . . owes fiduciary duties to the corporation, and to the shareholders
collectively.”).
145. It may seem that state entity-governance law could be an answer to concerns arising from
institutionalization in the investment advisory context by virtue of the fact that many private funds
formed under U.S. law (as opposed to under the law of so-called tax haven jurisdictions such as the
Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands) are formed as limited partnerships—and, more
specifically, Delaware limited partnerships. One suggestion is that, much as corporate directors owe
fiduciary obligations to shareholders as a group, general partners owe fiduciary obligations to limited
partnerships as a group. Indeed, the SEC threw its support behind this prospect in its 1985 adoption of
Rule 203(b)(3)-1 under the Advisers Act, which specified that an adviser to a limited partnership may
count the partnership, rather than each of its partners, as a client for purposes of the private adviser
exemption under then-section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)–1(a)(2)(i)
(2011). The SEC based the rule on the notion that an investment adviser to a fund does not manage
the fund based on the investors’ different investment objectives but instead manages the fund based
on the investors’ collective investment objectives. See Definition of “Client” of Investment Adviser for
Certain Purposes Relating to Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 8740, 8741 (proposed Mar. 5, 1985)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). However, in its adopting release, the SEC suggested that
regulatory protections would be available to the limited partners (who, in light of the rule, would not
have the protections of advisory clients) through “general partnership law,” which may provide that a
general partner owes certain fiduciary duties to the partnership’s limited partners. Id. at 8741 n.17.
That suggestion is problematic because it is not the case that state partnership law necessarily imposes
fiduciary obligations on general partners. Under the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, for example, to the extent that a general partner may otherwise be deemed to owe fiduciary
duties to the limited partnership or to any of its partners (for instance, under common law principles),
those “duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated” by the partnership agreement, provided
that “the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2011).

Krug_21 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

34

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2011 11:31 PM

[Vol. 63:1

reform would require that advisers owe obligations to two different
constituencies (the fund and its investors), then the challenge would be
to strike a balance between what obligations advisers should owe to the
now-intermediated investors and what obligations they should owe to the
intermediating institution, determining in the process how those
obligations should be coordinated so as to avoid or mitigate conflicts
between them.
Put another way, it would appear problematic if the obligations
advisers owed to the fund, on one hand, and to its investors, on the other
hand, were the same obligations. For example, if both the fund and its
investors were entitled under the Advisers Act to provide consent as to
an interested transaction proposed by the fund’s adviser, then there
surely would be a meaningful conflict if the investors, as a group,
declined to allow the transaction to proceed but the fund opted to allow
it (not an inconceivable result in light of the close relationship that
typically exists between a private fund and its adviser). Whose
preferences should take precedence and under what rationale? Before
diving into that thicket, and with the hopes of avoiding it altogether, it is
worth considering whether the types of obligations advisers should owe
to the funds they manage are in any way different in kind from the
obligations they should owe to the intermediated investors. If there is a
difference, then presumably the two sets of obligations would not conflict
with one another, and both the fund and its investors would be protected
in the ways most relevant to the particular relationship that exists
between each of them and the adviser.
As previously noted, advisers owe their clients obligations in
connection with the actual process of buying and selling issuer securities
146
on behalf of the clients’ accounts. It makes sense that those and similar
obligations are owed to the person or entity on whose behalf the adviser
is directly acting—that is, the fund, rather than its investors. The
Advisers Act’s disclosure and consent requirements are another matter,
however. Take, for example, the requirements that advisers seek the
consent of their clients under certain circumstances and provide certain
147
types of disclosures to their clients. A hedge fund, private equity fund,
or other private fund that an adviser may manage cannot speak for itself
and is not in a position to make decisions about its adviser’s capabilities
or track record (or anything else). Instead, such a fund is generally
controlled by the adviser that formed it, and it is that adviser who
generally speaks for the fund and makes decisions on the fund’s behalf.
In light of that circumstance, it serves little purpose to require the adviser
to seek the fund’s consent or to disclose conflicts of interest to the fund.

146. See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, if institutional investors, including intermediating entities
such as private funds, are more market-savvy and more sophisticated, by
whatever metric is used to measure “savvyness” and “sophistication,”
even where there is an arms-length relationship between the fund and
the adviser, the Advisers Act’s intricate consent and disclosure
148
requirements may verge on expendable. Conversely, it does make
sense for the adviser to direct disclosure, consent, and similar types of
obligations to the fund’s investors—the investors being those who
evaluate the adviser and determine whether to place capital with the
adviser (by investing in the fund) or to take their capital off the table (by
withdrawing it from the fund).
Indeed, these considerations suggest that, given its requirements
that disclosure and requests for consent be directed at the fund, the
current doctrine has become a proverbial round hole for the institutional
square pegs to which it now applies. Accordingly, one might reasonably
conclude that the obligations advisers owe their separate constituencies
(institutions versus the investors in them) will not conflict because, quite
simply, they are wholly different types of obligations. These considerations
also suggest two components of a reformed investment-adviser regulatory
regime. In particular, the changing landscape of advisory clients and the
intermediation employed by unitary investors highlights that regulation
should focus on the ultimate recipient of advisory services much more
than the instrumentalities and mechanisms—such as private funds—
through which advisory services have come to be provided. In other
words, regulation should reflect that the range of protections the
Advisers Act provides are unnecessary in the context of clients that are
intermediating institutions and that, in those circumstances, an
“antifraud-only” regime may be most suitable. Conversely, those
protections may still be appropriate for individual or smaller investors
who place assets in the intermediating institutions. An overlay to these
considerations is the circumstance that advisers’ activities for those who
directly contract for advisory services (for example, a hedge fund, rather
than its investors) should remain the subject of certain types of fiduciary
obligations, namely, those pertaining to participation in the securities
markets.
The implication of this analysis is that, in the context of investment
adviser regulation, where an adviser manages a private fund, multiple
beings and entities should collectively comprise the client to which the
full range of the adviser’s obligations are owed. Each of those subclients
would effectively share with the other the full range of the Advisers Act’s
protections in connection with the adviser’s activities managing the assets
that the investors have contributed to the fund. Some of the adviser’s

148. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
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obligations would be owed to the fund, and others would be owed to the
investors, based on their different statuses in the private-fund context. In
this way, investors would be protected from multiple angles: they would
have the disclosure that would allow them to evaluate the services
provided by the adviser and would be entitled to consent to those
transactions requiring “client” consent. The fund itself, however, would
be deemed the client for purposes of the adviser’s actions relating to
investing and reinvesting the fund’s assets. Accordingly, the adviser
would retain the obligation to achieve “best execution” in entering into
securities transactions and would be required to uphold fiduciary
obligations in connection with its (or related parties’) trading in the same
or similar securities or instruments.
B. Conflicting vs. Coordinated Interests
The approach this Article proposes, in which advisers would have
client-like obligations to the private funds they manage as well as to
those funds’ investors, may seem quite problematic at first blush. Any
service that a professional provides is typically provided to a single
person or entity. That is, in most professional contexts, the obligations
owed to the client and the activities to be performed on his or her behalf
typically are not subdivided among multiple disparate subclients. When,
for example, a lawyer represents a client that is a corporation or other
entity, numerous parties such as the corporation’s executives and
directors may be involved in the representation or speak on behalf of the
149
corporation in connection with the representation.
Ultimately,
however, the lawyer’s obligations are owed only to the corporation and
150
not to any of those individuals. A similar analysis logically applies to
other professionals, from architects to consultants to roofers to
psychiatrists, though, to be sure, only in some contexts are the
professional’s obligations fiduciary in nature or the client-professional
relationship imbued with special features, such as the attorney-client
151
privilege or doctor-patient confidentiality.
Moreover, professional relationships that do not follow the unitary
client model highlight the intuitive concerns arising from an agent’s
attempt to serve two masters. The U.S. auditing profession provides one
prominent example of this other paradigm, a by-product of the
mandatory audit requirement that federal securities laws impose on

149. See Carl A. Pierce et al., Professional Responsibility in the Life of the Lawyer 400 (2011).
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Sonja R. West, The Story of Us: Resolving the Face-Off Between Autobiographical
Speech and Information Privacy, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 589, 619 (2010) (“It is . . . generally accepted
that certain relationships embody an implied promise of confidentiality. These relationships include an
individual’s dealings with her doctor, her banker, her clergy member, or her lawyer.”).
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152

public companies. In the mandatory audit system, auditors’ formal
clients are the companies that engage them to perform the mandatory
audit and whose boards of directors (through independent audit
153
committees) manage the audit relationships. The audit system also
imposes on auditors an “obligation to serve an unspecified ‘investing
public,’” even though that investing public “neither hires, fires, nor
154
controls the auditors.” However, the requirement that auditors, in
effect, serve two masters places them in an untenable position that,
155
among other things, renders true auditor independence impossible. If a
company’s auditor has a type of fiduciary responsibility to the public,
then to whom, as among the investing public, company management,
shareholders, and creditors, shall the auditor owe its allegiance given that
the interests of those constituencies will not often be aligned?
156
Presumably, the auditor, as agent, cannot serve both masters faithfully.
The concern that an adviser’s having dual client allegiances will
necessarily lead to the too-many-masters problem can perhaps be most
readily addressed by the fact that, as contemplated in this Article, the
adviser would owe the masters two different kinds of obligations. One
way of thinking about this two-tiered division of obligations is to regard
the adviser as providing two distinct types of client services: direct
advisory services (to the fund, as the legal owner of the fund’s
investments) and indirect advisory services (to the investors, as the
beneficial owners of those investments). To be sure, those distinct
services would not be completely separate, in that they would be
symbiotic and part of the same larger enterprise. But the point is simply
that there is nothing important about the structure of the typical clientprofessional relationship or the assumed impossibility of an agent’s
serving two masters that is conclusive about the viability of implementing
a two-tiered client structure in the investment advisory context.
Of course, even if one accepts from a theoretical perspective that
the fiduciary and other obligations owed by an investment adviser in the
private-fund context can or should be owed to multiple parties, there
152. See Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants and Congress
Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 741, 820–27 (2004).
153. See Sean M. O’Connor, Strengthening Auditor Independence: Reestablishing Audits as Control
and Premium Signaling Mechanisms, 81 Wash. L. Rev. 525, 570–75 (2006).
154. Id. at 525; see id. at 571 (“[T]he statutory audit . . . put auditors in an untenable position
serving many masters, while being controlled (e.g., hired, fired, and paid) by the party that is in fact the
agent to be audited.”); see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817–18 (1984)
(“By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial status, the
independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with
the client . . . . [and] owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as
to the investing public.”).
155. See O’Connor, supra note 153, at 572.
156. See id. (citing Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law
After Enron, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 449, 449 (2002)).
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remains the question of whether that approach would be workable in
practice—that is, whether investment advisers realistically would be able
to regard different “things” as their client for purposes of different
obligations and requirements under the Advisers Act. Although the
answer to that question must, at least in part, remain to be seen, the
practices of investment advisers today suggest that, from the perspective
of advisers themselves in connection with their day-to-day activities, the
new approach should not present undue challenges. That is simply a
product of the fact that the current doctrine, under which the fund is
regarded as the client for all purposes, is sufficiently ill suited to how
advisers generally run their businesses that, for many purposes, advisers
have tended to regard their investors as “clients,” notwithstanding that
doctrine.
To be sure, investment advisers understand that, under the Advisers
Act and under most states’ investment-adviser regulatory regimes, the
funds they manage are technically their clients. Yet when they speak of
their “clients,” they are almost always referring to the investors in those
funds. The investors, after all, are the persons to whom an adviser must
“sell” its investment strategy, as well as the ones whom the adviser must
keep happy through solid performance, lest the investors determine to
withdraw their capital and seek better investments elsewhere. Investors,
in other words, are the persons to whom advisers regard themselves as
providing their services, much like a client of any other professional is
the person who engages the professional and to whom the professional
provides its services. For investment advisers, the fund simply cannot be
in that role, given that the fund is usually a creature of the adviser’s own
creation, formed entirely for the purpose of allowing the adviser to invest
the assets of others. It has no real purpose or meaning apart from that
facilitating function. As a result of advisers’ somewhat purposeful
confusion about the identity of their clients, then, it would be a short leap
for them to regard their investors as clients in connection with at least
some of their duties as advisers. Yet that leap would be significant,
creating efficiencies by eliminating doubt and confusion among advisers
as to whether for regulatory compliance purposes their obligations are
appropriately directed to the fund or, rather, to its investors.
The framework this Article proposes, then, would transfer from the
fund to its investors the sorts of protections under the Advisers Act that
the investors would have enjoyed had they placed capital with the fund’s
adviser directly. It would reflect the changes in investment advisers’
businesses over the past several decades, from one in which advisers had
numerous discrete clients to one in which, for efficiency and flexibility
reasons, they came to aggregate clients’ assets into intermediating
entities—hedge funds and other private funds—with each “client”
owning his or her pro rata portion of the fund, based on the amount of
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capital contributed, as it has appreciated or depreciated over time. There
is nothing about that change in the means of providing advisory services
that calls for depriving those who have their assets at risk from
regulatory protections designed for advisory “clients,” however those
protections should be revised or amended over time.

V. Further Refinements
There are, as one might suppose, some fairly apparent objections to
this Article’s reconceptualization of “client.” One of these objections
centers on the notion that providing regulatory protections to privatefund investors is unnecessary, given the financial sophistication standards
they are required to meet in order to invest. The second arises from this
Article’s proposal that fund investors be deemed clients for certain
purposes and is based on the long-standing and oft-recited notion that an
investment adviser’s services are necessarily personal to its clients,
tailored to each client’s particular needs and circumstances. A fund’s
investors, after all, almost certainly will not all have the same investment
objectives and requirements. This Part will discuss each of these
objections in turn.
A. Existing Regulatory Protections
This Article’s proposal may appear to be little more than a straw
man. In particular, one imagines that advisory clients of an earlier era
were generally persons of means whose need for investing advice was
perhaps greater than that of those whose assets were more meager. That
assumption is consistent with the growth of private funds in the past
several decades and the circumstance that many private-fund investors
are those who, absent the intermediation provided by those pooled
investment structures, would likely enter into asset management
arrangements directly with investment advisers. Or, put another way,
investments in private funds, like the direct client-adviser relationships
they have supplanted, tend to be pursued by those who are better off and
more financially sophisticated as compared with the public in general. If
that is the case, the question is obvious: Why do wealthy investors such
as those who invest in private funds need the protections of the Advisers
Act or any other laws and regulations governing investment advisers?
The short answer is that they may not. For example, if the
financially sophisticated persons who engage an investment adviser
directly were not entitled to the regulatory protections—whatever those
protections may be—to which less sophisticated advisory clients were
entitled, then arguably those persons should similarly not be entitled to
the protections in connection with their investments in private funds
managed by the adviser. However, such a distinction based on wealth or
sophistication has not, since the beginning, been embodied in the
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Advisers Act. Rather, under the Advisers Act, investment advisers
become subject to regulation under that Act based on their activities
managing assets, regardless of the wealth or sophistication of the persons
157
who own those assets.
The determination that clients’ financial sophistication does not
matter for regulatory purposes is simply a policy matter. Upon additional
reflection and debate, it may indeed be the case that the best model for
investment adviser regulation is one in which clients’ (and investors’)
financial sophistication (however that might be measured) is taken into
account, with the more financially sophisticated clients (and investors)
beyond the purview of regulatory protection. That sort of extensive
analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article’s argument is
simply that, to the extent that policy governing investment advisers’
relationships to their clients does not contemplate a distinction among
clients based on wealth or financial sophistication or any other metric,
then neither should advisers’ relationships to the investors in the funds
that they manage reflect any such distinction. Put another way, the
current difference in regulatory treatment as between direct clients and
fund investors is merely form over substance. What that “substance” is,
however, is always up for debate.
There is an obvious retort to this argument, however, which is that,
in fact, a client’s move from a direct advisory relationship (and the
regulatory protections it involves) to an indirect relationship through
investing in a private fund involves a change of substance as well as form.
That assertion is based on the securities laws governing the issuance of
securities: Hedge funds and other private funds, like any other issuers,
must offer their partnership interests, shares, units, or other securities in
158
compliance with federal and state securities laws. Whereas some issuers
wish to offer their securities publicly and therefore must register those
securities under the Securities Act of 1933, hedge funds and other private
159
funds, by definition, offer their interests privately. The particular
157. See 2004 Proposed Rule, supra note 47, at 45,173 (“While provisions of the Securities
Act . . . provide exemptions from registration under that Act for securities transactions with
persons . . . that have such knowledge and experience that they are considered capable of fending for
themselves and thus do not need the protections of the applicable registration provisions, the Advisers
Act does not. . . . The Advisers Act is intended to protect all types of investors who have entrusted
their assets to a professional investment adviser.”).
158. In particular, at the federal level, section 5 of the Securities Act provides,
Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any
person . . . to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security . . . or cause to be carried through
the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any
such security for the purpose of sale . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 77e (2010). Any issuer not complying with section 5 needs to meet the requirements of an
exemption from registration set forth in section 4 of the Securities Act. See id. § 77d.
159. The particular exemptions from registration under the Investment Company Act on which
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requirements to which they must adhere are set forth in the private160
placement safe harbor of Regulation D under the Securities Act.
Under section 506 of Regulation D, an issuer is deemed to be
making a private offering of securities—and, therefore, will not be
subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act—if, among
other things, the offering is made only to “accredited investors” and no
161
more than thirty-five non-accredited investors. If a prospective investor
is not “accredited,” then the issuer must provide to the investor a
disclosure document containing generally the same type of information
about the issuer and its finances and operations as would be contained in
a registration statement if the issuer were required to register the
162
securities under the Securities Act. The theory underlying these
requirements is that there is no policy basis for applying the protections
of the Securities Act to wealthy investors because those investors are
either sophisticated or able to engage competent financial professionals
163
to assist them.
Accordingly, the laws and regulations pursuant to which private
funds are required to offer their interests provide that unless a
prospective private-fund investor has a certain net worth or income level,
the fund must provide to the investor the sort of disclosure that publicly
traded companies, including mutual funds, are required to supply to their
investors. Because those requirements are specific to issuers of securities,
and because direct advisory relationships generally do not involve the
164
issuance of securities, the requirements do not apply to direct advisory
relationships—meaning that direct advisory clients do not need to qualify
as accredited investors, nor, therefore, are they entitled to receive a
disclosure document in the event they do not meet the accredited
investor standards. As a result of these requirements, then, one
conclusion (again, a retort to the form-over-substance argument

hedge funds and most other private funds rely require that the sales of the funds’ securities be made in
a manner not involving a public offering. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2010).
160. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–508 (2011).
161. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(e)(1)(iv), 230.506. As defined in Regulation D, “accredited
investors” include individuals (that is, natural persons) whose net worth (combined with that of her
spouse) exceeds $1,000,000 (not including the value of the individual’s primary residence) or whose
income in the two most recent years exceeded $200,000 (or joint income with her spouse exceeded
$300,000) and who expects generally the same income level in the current year. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a)(5)-(6).
162. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(b), 230.506.
163. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 Del. J. Corp. L. 151,
169 (2010).
164. There are some exceptions to this. For example, largely for tax reasons, some direct advisory
relationships have been established using a partnership or LLC, with the advisory client being the only
investor in the entity. For all practical purposes, it is a direct advisory arrangement. Nonetheless, the
client buys a security when it contributes its capital to the entity, and the entity therefore must comply
with the securities laws in accepting that capital.
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presented above) might be that this additional layer of regulation renders
it somehow safer or more protective for investors to place their capital in
a private fund managed by their adviser of choice rather than to enter
into a direct advisory relationship with that adviser.
This prospect, too, may be discounted. As others have pointed out,
the private-placement rules under Regulation D do not provide any
particular substantive protections. Rather, they provide the framework
for an “antifraud-only” private-placement market, in which “issuers are
constrained primarily by the dictates of antifraud rules prohibiting
165
intentional wrongdoing.” To be sure, the requirement that issuers not
intentionally mislead their investors or otherwise engage in intentional
misconduct vis-à-vis their investors may seem to be some measure of
protection. However, there is some doubt as to whether it amounts to
much. Indeed, a few commentators have been particularly critical of the
antifraud-only nature of the private-placement market, at least insofar as
individual investors are participants. One claim is that, although an
antifraud-only regulatory structure may be suitable for institutional
166
investors, individual investors need more protections. Another claim is
that the section 506 offering has become, in the words of one state
167
regulator, “a favorite vehicle for fraudulent transactions.” At the heart
of those concerns is the anxiety, voiced by other commentators, that
Regulation D’s accredited-investors requirement means only that
private-placement investors will be wealthy; it does not mean they will be
168
sophisticated.
For present purposes, more important than the perceived
inadequacies with the regulatory protections afforded by the privateplacement markets is that antifraud obligations required of issuers in
those markets are obligations to which all other participants in the
169
securities markets are subject as well. Therefore, they provide no
particular protections that investors would not have if, instead of
participating in, say, a private fund’s offering, they invested in the public

165. Johnson, supra note 163, at 197.
166. As Jennifer Johnson has noted, “[A]ntifraud-only markets may be acceptable for institutional
players, but they are not designed for individual investors. . . . While such individuals may in fact
qualify as accredited investors under the wealth standard formulated in 1982, there is a growing
recognition that such individuals need some protection from the schemes of the unscrupulous.” Id. at
197–98.
167. Id. at 188. Johnson further notes that “over half of the complaints state regulators receive
involve securities fraud resulting from nonpublic offerings directed to senior citizens.” Id. at 189.
168. See Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 Okla. L. Rev. 291, 299 (1994) (arguing that the logic that
accredited investors will “have the bargaining power or sophistication to demand and obtain”
thorough disclosure about an issuer without legal action “breaks down” for accredited investors whose
“status stems from their income level or net worth”).
169. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2010) (setting forth a Securities Act prohibition on fraudulent
interstate securities transactions).
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securities markets or sought advice from a broker-dealer—or entered
into a direct advisory relationship with the fund’s investment adviser. To
sharpen that point: The applicability of the securities laws to an
investor’s indirect placement of assets with an investment adviser
through a private fund produces no regulatory protections that were not
already there to begin with. Arguably, however, it does result in less
regulatory protection as compared with entering into a direct advisory
relationship, in that, in the latter context, the adviser is obligated to
provide ongoing disclosure (on at least an annual basis) and subject to
consent and certain other substantive requirements that are not part of
the private-placement regulatory regime.
That realization does not dispose of the prospect that the rules
governing private funds’ offerings could provide additional protections to
investors. Much like the discussion above regarding whether clients’
wealth or sophistication should matter for purposes of the Advisers Act’s
regulatory scope, this prospect is simply a matter of policy. Accordingly,
just as the Advisers Act can be amended and revised to reflect new
analyses and conclusions regarding whether wealthy clients should be
given the Act’s protections, so could the rules governing how private
funds offer their securities be amended to reflect new conclusions about
the extent to which individual investors require additional protections in
connection with their evaluating and buying those securities. In theory,
the securities laws could be structured such that investors in private
placements would be entitled to an array of regulatory protections, such
as extensive disclosure about the issuer or possibly specified voting and
170
consent rights. Certainly that could give one who invests in a private
fund an equivalent degree of regulatory protection, as compared with
that person’s entering into direct advisory arrangement.

170. Such a change would bring regulation of private funds closer to the regulatory system
governing mutual funds and other regulated funds, a prospect that perhaps raises the further question
of whether the best approach for addressing regulatory problems associated with private funds might
be to eliminate the concept of a private fund. That is, perhaps all investment vehicles—regardless of
the number or financial sophistication of their investors—should be required to register under the
Investment Company Act. That approach, however, does not seem desirable, largely because of the
operational efficiency and investment flexibility permitted by freedom from Investment Company Act
regulation. That efficiency and flexibility has value in the financial and capital markets, promoting
market liquidity and price discovery, reducing market volatility, and providing portfolio-diversification
tools. See Dan Awrey, The Limits of EU Hedge Fund Regulation, 5 Law & Fin. Mkts. Rev. 119, 119
(2011). In light of these considerations, this Article proceeds on the basis that private funds serve
important functions in the financial markets and that tailored regulatory changes such as those this
Article proposes can address the concerns arising from institutionalization while preserving the
flexibility and efficiency that characterizes private funds.
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B. Personalized and Tailored Advice
A second possible objection to the approach advocated in this
Article is based on the longstanding and widely shared notion that an
investment adviser’s relationship to each of its clients is personal, with
the adviser tailoring its investment advice to suit each client’s particular
investment needs and goals. As discussed above, this notion is as old as
the Advisers Act itself and has endured thanks in part to the Supreme
Court’s recognition and apparent endorsement of it. The 1985 case Lowe
171
v. SEC contains perhaps the strongest affirmation. That case involved a
company, Lowe Management Corporation, whose registration as an
investment adviser was revoked by the SEC after the firm’s president
and primary shareholder, Christopher Lowe, was found to have engaged
in a variety of fraudulent activities, including misappropriating client
172
funds and stealing from a bank. In addition to revoking the firm’s
registration, the SEC had ordered Mr. Lowe not to associate with any
173
investment advisers going forward. Despite all of that, Mr. Lowe
proceeded to publish a newsletter relating to securities investments,
174
which from time to time he distributed to subscribers. In response, the
SEC sued Mr. Lowe, seeking to enjoin him from publishing his
newsletter on the basis that, by doing so, he was “engaged in the business
of advising others ‘as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or
selling securities.’” In other words, the SEC believed he was acting as an
investment adviser and, by virtue of using the mails in connection with
his business, was in violation of the registration requirement of the
175
Advisers Act.
In reversing the Second Circuit’s decision in favor of the SEC, the
Supreme Court held that Mr. Lowe’s activities fell within an exclusion in
the Advisers Act’s definition of “investment adviser” for a publisher “of
any bona fide newspaper, news magazine, or business or financial
publication of general and regular circulation,” notwithstanding Mr.
Lowe’s inauspicious history and that he published his newsletter only
176
sporadically and not according to a regular publication schedule. The
Court’s reasoning centered in large part on its observation, based on its
177
understanding of the Advisers Act’s origins and legislative history, that
the Act was “designed to apply to those persons . . . who provide

171. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
172. Id. at 183.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 184–85.
175. Id. at 184 (citation omitted).
176. Id. at 208–11.
177. The Court noted that the Act’s “legislative history plainly demonstrates that Congress was
primarily interested in regulating the business of rendering personalized investment advice.” Id. at 204.
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personalized advice attuned to a client’s concerns,” and was not
intended to encompass those who published materials that were not
personalized or tailored to any particular person’s needs or to any
particular portfolio and that were not tied to specific market activity or
179
events.
One apparent inference from Lowe, then, is that when each “client”
receives investment advice as one of several investors in a private fund
sponsored by the adviser—and thereby receives exactly the same advice
as each other investor in the fund—it is difficult to argue that the advice
is in any way “personal” to the client or tailored to his or her particular
circumstances. This concern would seem to be particularly pronounced in
light of a number of statements in the Act’s legislative history that the
Lowe Court recited. For example, the Court pointed to a 1939 report of
180
the SEC (“SEC Report”), prepared at Congress’s direction for the
purpose of making recommendations as to the regulation of investment
companies and investment advisers. This Report documented a belief
held by at least some in the investment advisory industry that investment
advisers’ mandate was to serve “individuals and institutions with
substantial funds who require continuous supervision of their
investments and a program of investment to cover their entire economic
181
needs.” The Court additionally pointed out that industry representatives
perceived a distinction between the “functions” of “investment
counselors” (in other words, investment advisers) and those of
investment companies or, as they were sometimes called, investment
trusts (that is, public investment funds). For support, the Court quoted
the views of one such representative, who testified that “the ordinary
investment trust . . . . takes no cognizance of [an investor’s] total financial
position in investing his money for him, and . . . gives [the investor] no
182
judgment in the matter whatever.” Not only, then, was investment
advisers’ “true function” to “give advice in connection with the specific

178. Id. at 207–08.
179. Id. at 208–11.
180. SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 76-477 (1939).
181. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 192–93 (emphasis added) (citing SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment
Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 25 (1939) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
182. Id. at 193 n.34 (quoting SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No.
76-477, at 26–27 (1939) (testimony of James N. White of the investment advisory firm Scudder,
Stevens & Clark)). The Court further quoted Mr. White’s reaction to the statement that an investment
trust differs from an investment “counselor” in that it “does not give the advice with the peculiar,
particular, specific financial condition of the individual [investor] and what he hopes to accomplish, for
what purpose.” Id. In implied agreement, Mr. White responded, “Might I also add that in a number of
cases at least . . . the investment trust managers do not consider their funds as a proper repository for
all of an individual’s capital. It is not [only] that it doesn’t consider only his personal peculiarities and
needs, but it does not give him a complete financial program.” Id.
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condition of a particular individual,” but it was also seen to be
providing advice as to all of that individual’s investments.
Based on Lowe, one might conclude that fund investors cannot be
considered advisory clients because one necessary characteristic of client
status is ongoing receipt of investment advice formulated specifically for
the particular client and her entire investment portfolio, in light of her
financial circumstances and goals. Indeed, in 2006 the D.C. Circuit
embraced this conception of investment advisory services in reaching its
184
conclusion in Goldstein v. SEC. The D.C. Circuit invalidated the SEC’s
attempt to effectively change the definition of “client” to mean fund
investors (rather than the fund itself) solely for purposes of a registration
exemption under the Advisers Act on which many hedge fund managers
185
had relied to avoid being regulated by the SEC. Relying in part on
Lowe, the Goldstein court concluded that a hedge fund’s investors
186
cannot be considered clients of the fund’s investment adviser.
The long-standing principle that investment advice is necessarily
personalized and tailored to the client gives rise to perhaps the most
formidable objection to the reformulation of “client” that this Article
proposes. However, when more closely evaluated, it becomes apparent
that the objection is hollow. To see this requires delving into how the
principle came to be. A good place to start is the 1939 SEC Report on
which the Lowe Court relied. The Report comprised a survey of
investment counsel and their services at the time and was intended to
“indicate[] the growth, development, and magnitude of the investment
counsel business and point[] out some of the problems which appear[ed]
187
to be present or inherent therein.” The survey expressly did not
encompass any advisers who provided investment advice “solely through

183. Id. The Court also quoted the testimony of Charles M. O’Hearn, vice president and director
of Clarke, Sinsabaugh & Co., before a Senate subcommittee during hearings on the bill that became
the Advisers Act:
[The investment adviser profession] is a personal-service profession and depends for its
success upon a close personal and confidential relationship between the investment-counsel
firm and its client. . . .
....
Judgment of the client’s circumstances and of the soundness of his financial objections
and of the risks he may assume. Judgment is the root and branch of the decisions to
recommend changes in a client’s security holdings.
Id. at 196 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 713–16).
184. 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
185. The SEC’s change effectively meant that those investment advisers were required to register
as investment advisers under the Advisers Act (and, therefore, to be subject to the SEC’s regulation)
because the exemption turned on an adviser’s having fewer than fifteen “clients.” Id. at 876.
186. See id. at 880.
187. SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 1 (1939).
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publications distributed to a list of subscribers and did not furnish
188
specific advice to any client.”
To gather data for the Report, the SEC asked investment advisers
to complete a questionnaire seeking basic information about their firms,
such as their form of organization, number of employees, and types of
clients, and about their activities, such as the nature of their services,
their affiliations with “investment trusts and investment companies,”
their other business activities, the extent of their control over client
accounts, their “investment policies,” the “type, number, and size” of
their clients’ accounts, and the business experience of their officers and
189
directors. The SEC primarily based its Report on the answers provided
190
by the 394 advisers who completed the questionnaire. However, the
Report additionally included statements of representatives of certain
investment advisory firms who had testified regarding the “status,
functions, general problems, and possible regulation[] of investment
counsel organizations” at a February 1938 “public conference” that the
191
SEC had sponsored.
Consistent with Lowe, the SEC Report reports that one function of
investment advisers is to provide investment advice “on a personal
192
basis.” Among other supporting evidence, the Report cited the
testimony of one investment adviser representative, who had replied in
the affirmative to the SEC’s asking whether investment advisory services
arose both to provide “a disinterested, impartial appraisal of the intrinsic
merits of a particular investment” an individual might be considering,
and to determine “whether that was the type of investment that would fit
193
into [the individual’s] general personal investment program.” Indeed,
the SEC questioner surmised (with approval from the representative)
that the personalized advice provided by “legitimate” investment
advisers is what distinguished them from “individuals who are professed
194
tipsters,” whose activities served to undermine the investment advisory
profession and to support the call for investment adviser regulation.
Drawing on its understanding that investment advice was, or at least
could be, specially formulated for each client, the SEC was able to draw
a distinction between the good and the bad in the investment advisory
profession. On one hand was the adviser who “desires to give that
impartial scientific professional advice to persons who are trying to plan

188. Id.
189. Id. at 2.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 23; see also id. at 30 (“[I]n fact, the contract or relationship between investment counsel
and client is a personal one . . . .”).
193. Id. at 24–25.
194. Id. at 25.
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their economic situation in the light of accomplishing various results,
making provision for old age, education, and so forth,” and, on the other
hand, were those advisers seeking to make a quick buck for themselves
195
by recommending a particular stock to anyone who would listen.
That distinction is reminiscent of the distinction drawn by the Lowe
Court, where those providing “personalized” advice relating to securities
were deemed investment advisers, while those providing stock
196
recommendations to unlimited subscribers were not so deemed.
Admittedly, the distinction highlighted in the SEC Report (legitimate
advisers versus “professed tipsters”) is one between legitimate and
illegitimate advisory activities, whereas the distinction made in Lowe
(investment advisers versus publishers) is one between two legitimate
professional activities. For present purposes, that difference does not
matter. The important point is that both in legislative history and in case
law, advisers are seen to provide personalized and tailored advice not
necessarily because that is the defining characteristic of providing
investment advice but rather because it is a characteristic, present in at
least some investment advisory relationships, that is the exact opposite of
“advice” provided to anyone who will listen. However, finding that
advice spread far and wide is not really investment advice need not
exclude impersonal advice from the category of investment advice, so
long as that advice is not provided to the public at large. History has
heavily influenced the perception that an advisory relationship has to be
tailored to the specific needs of the client who receives it, but the
perception is merely that: a perception. When we view the meaning of
the term “personal” more broadly, as meaning not public or available to
all, it ceases to constitute an obstacle to the reconceptualization of
“client” this Article proposes.
Indeed, that is how the SEC itself seems to view “personal,” in light
of some of its interpretations of what constitutes giving investment
advice. Although the Lowe holding removed bona fide publications of
general and regular circulation from the menu of the ways in which one
may be deemed to be providing investment advice, the holding did not
implicate another form of publication that the SEC continues to view as
investment advice: the issuance of research reports on particular
197
companies. The issuers of such reports, which are the product of an
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 177–79.
197. Cf. Regulatory Flexibility Agenda, 59 Fed. Reg. 58,626, 58,630 (1994) (“The [SEC] Division
of Corporation Finance is considering recommending that the Commission propose rules intended to
ensure that investors who read . . . research reports[] and other investment advice regarding specific
securities will receive adequate disclosure when issuers, underwriters and dealers have paid for the
published investment advice.” (emphasis added)); Charterhouse Tilney, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993
WL 277798, at *5–6 (July 15, 1993) (setting forth that the SEC staff would not require a non-U.S.
broker-dealer that furnished research reports to “major U.S. institutional investors” to become

Krug_21 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

December 2011]

12/5/2011 11:31 PM

THE HEDGE FUND PROBLEM

49

analyst’s evaluation of subject companies, typically do not distribute
them in the manner of bona fide publications (as defined in Lowe) and
198
hence cannot avail themselves of the Lowe doctrine. Rather, those who
publish research reports typically make those reports available for
purchase by investors who, for their part, purchase any given report
based on their interest in the company the report covers. Accordingly,
investors select which publications they receive in light of their personal
investment needs and forego the others. However, it cannot be said that
these types of research reports are in any way “personal” to their
ultimate consumers: every buyer of a particular report receives exactly
the same content. Yet the SEC deems the issuers of research reports to
be “investment advisers” to the same extent as a financial planner
providing customized advice regarding all aspects of its clients’
199
portfolios.
That may seem incongruent with the Advisers Act’s
legislative history, focusing as it does on personalized advice as the
defining characteristic of an investment adviser, and Lowe’s heavy
reliance on that definition.
Lowe and the SEC Report’s history have obfuscated the matter,
encouraging the perception that investment advice somehow needs to be
tailored to each particular client. Indeed, one need look no further than
the definition of “investment adviser” under the Advisers Act to realize
that such an interpretation cannot be correct. Under the Advisers Act,
an investment adviser is anyone who,
for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either
directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities
or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities,
or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
200
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.

Under that definition, the issuance of publications and reports
constitutes giving investment advice (unless those reports or publications
fall within the publisher’s exemption that Lowe articulated). But it is
difficult to comprehend how providing advice through reports and
publications is consistent with the notion that investment advice has to
be personalized and tailored, unless “personalized” and “tailored” mean
something different from what the Lowe and Goldstein courts assumed
they mean—or unless, despite the oft-cited testimony to the contrary,

registered with the SEC as an investment adviser where, among other things, the broker-dealer
distributed the reports in a manner designed not to induce transactions in the securities described in
the report).
198. These issuers are often able to avoid registration as investment advisers, however. In the U.S.
investment industry, research reports are typically the product of research conducted by registered
brokerage firms that, given their registration status, can rely on an exemption from investment adviser
registration specifically for registered broker-dealers. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-1 (2011).
199. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
200. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2010) (emphasis added).
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“personalized” and “tailored” are not particularly relevant concepts in
determining whether someone is providing investment advice. The latter
possibility garners further support from the fact that the definition of
investment adviser quoted above also contemplates that investment
advice need not even be “direct,” but instead can be provided through
201
publications and reports.
From a pragmatic perspective, moreover, it has to be the case that
an investment adviser need not provide advice as to all of its clients’
portfolios. Given the range and possibilities of investment strategies and
objectives, investment advisers, like any professional, necessarily develop
and focus on—and market—particular strengths. That different
investment advisers cover different areas of the investment universe is
only desirable, in that it permits specialization and the development of
expertise. Arguably, that fact by itself makes it wholly inappropriate for
a single investment adviser to advise its clients on all aspects of their
portfolios, given the well-accepted premise that investors should
diversify their holdings. Even outside the fund context, such as advisory
arrangements made directly between clients and advisers, an adviser’s
advice will fall within a limited spectrum of investments. Consistent with
that reality, the client will not have placed all of her assets in the account
the adviser manages. If advisers ever were defined by their provision of
all-encompassing investment advice, the world has simply become too
complex for that to be the case today.
In short, there is nothing about investment advice or advisers’
fiduciary duties under the Advisers Act that requires that the advice be
personalized or tailored or otherwise specially designed for each
particular recipient of the advice. Accordingly, it is consistent with the
extant investment-adviser legal and regulatory regime for fund investors
to be deemed advisory clients, notwithstanding that the advice each of
them receives in connection with their investment is identical to the
advice afforded every other investor. That possibility, additionally,
eliminates concerns that typically arise in the multiple-client context in
which advisers are obligated to provide personalized advice to each
separate client. In the latter context, there typically arise concerns that
the adviser may have the opportunity or incentive to favor certain clients
over others, particularly if the fee arrangements among clients differ.
When each client is to be treated the same as each other client, and each

201. This analysis also suggests that statements to the effect that investment advisers necessarily
advise their clients as to the entirety of their portfolios, which are scattered through the legislative
history and the SEC Report, should carry little weight. It is not just that such pronouncements are
contrary to fact and the SEC’s current view of the issue. Rather, if an investment adviser qualifies as
such simply by virtue of its issuing publications and reports about securities, that adviser virtually ipso
facto is not providing comprehensive advice to its clients.
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client is aware of that fact, the thorny problem of how best to dissipate
possible conflicts of interest dissolves.

Conclusion
The institutionalization phenomenon extends beyond the context in
which it is typically evaluated—the relationship of investors to corporate
issuers. It pervades relationships in the financial industry, particularly
that between investment advisers and their clients. This Article has
demonstrated that the growth of private funds in the past few decades
has institutionalized the provision of investment advisory services and
led to the intermediation of the relationship between advisers and those
who, in a previous era, would be their clients but who, today, are
investors in the funds they manage. However, as this Article has also
shown, regulation of investment advisers has not kept up with those
developments, to the detriment of individuals and smaller investors who
seek advisory services. This Article has argued that investment adviser
regulation should expressly acknowledge the institutionalization of
advisory clients, through entitling private-fund investors to certain rights
held by those deemed clients under the Advisers Act and its rules.
Through the broader understanding of the nature and evolution of
investment adviser regulation entailed by those changes, such regulation
would, one hopes, continue to further investor protection—the original
and arguably primary mandate of securities regulation.
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